1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

If it was at times urged forward by its few modernists and by the example of the local minorities, it was retarded by retrograde self-interested elements in 'Iraqi as in Turkish society. Above all, 'Balik Başdan Kokar'—the fish putrefies from its head downwards: 'Iraq was but part of an Empire whose central government in 1900 was an inept and seedy despotism distracted by constant alarms and suspicions, lectured by the Powers, preyed on by adventurers, working by spies and tale-bearers, and rotten with corruption and nepotism. There was at Sublime Porte and Yildiz alike more willingness to gain time and weaken opposition by playing off rival forces, bribing the dangerous and reassuring with false promises, than to initiate clean and effective government, of which even the ideal as well as all the material means were lacking. From this central government the 'Iraq wilayas depended, from its ranks came the senior officials to every sanjaq and department, and to it the intriguers and malcontents of 'Iraq could bear their tales.

Economically, as has been seen, great hopes had been formed of 'Iraq development. Politically, it was the Sultan's way to woo the important town families—and notably those of religious pretension—by favours and courtesies: to encourage Sunni shrines and charities: to stress the Caliphate aspect of his rule: to be known as planning a railway to Mecca and Madina: to increase pan-Islamic preaching to align Arab with Turk: and to retain an Arab personal bodyguard. Towards its tribal problem the policy was that to which any government must sooner or later have been driven: in the impossibility of finding tribal elements capable of loyal vassaldom, and the certainty that the shaykhs would always abuse all power permitted to them, it could only be a policy of the introduction of direct rule by practicable stages. But such a project was resisted by nine-tenths of the tribal leaders, because it was fatal to their own favoured position; its enforcement therefore involved a ceaseless struggle by Government to assert its paramountcy and to drive the shaykhs to acquiescence. The varying character of Governors and the poverty of their resources led to many inconsistencies, nor was it always possible to make military demonstrations or launch successful punitive columns. It seemed at times more politic to overlook flagrant offence, to support a paramount shaykh or even to name him (as had happened) Governor of the sanjaq itself; and sometimes the shaykh could, in defiance of all policy, buy his requirements of authority or impunity for cash. 'The sword—and the sugar!' was the Turkish administrator's formula for 'Iraq.

As to politics, under the Ḥamidiyan régime political life could not be expected. It was precluded by the static and alien nature of Government, and by the pervasive spy system. Towards the Turkish Government as a whole there could be no 'Iraqi attitude

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

642 By the early weeks of that year the situation in 'Iraq had vastly improved; there was now time and opportunity to proceed further with constitutional and administrative development, and not least with the selection of a ruler. The insurrection was over, though tribal disquiet persisted in the Muntafiq and in various degrees elsewhere. In spite of obvious imperfections, a Government by 'Iraqis was operating. Ministers were showing goodwill and patience, and the lone hand evidently played by Sayid Ṭalib was
648* not for the moment menacing. A frontier agreement had been made with the French in Syria in December 1920; and though it fixed a boundary which, since it appeared to bisect both the Jabal Sinjar and Albu Kamal, was in fact ignored, frontier relations were by now at least non-violent. The persistent propaganda and trouble-making from across the Turkish frontier had not seriously perverted the 'Iraqi-Kurdish or the Euphrates tribes. Peace between the Allies and Turkey had been made, even though the new conditions now supervening in that country already condemned the Sèvres Treaty to nullity.

008 In London 'Iraq affairs from 1921 onwards were handled by a newly created Middle Eastern department of the Colonial Office; and the first action of Mr. Winston Churchill, transferred from the War Office as Colonial Secretary, was to convene a Conference at Cairo which should decide, once and for all, the many outstanding Middle Eastern questions. It met on 12 March 1921, attended by the highest Service personalities, Foreign Office and Treasury experts, Churchill's Eastern advisers including Lawrence, and, from 'Iraq, Sir Percy Cox accompanied by General Haldane, Ja'far al-'Askari, Sasun Ḥaṣqayl, Gertrude Bell, and two of the ministerial Advisers. The agenda, as far as concerned 'Iraq, included the selection of a ruler, the treatment of the 'Iraqi Kurds, the early reduction of British expenditure, and the composition of the forces designed to secure the defence of 'Iraq after the withdrawal of British garrisons.

643 For the post of Amir or King of 'Iraq, no local candidate had commanded anything approaching adequate support. The Naqib was advanced in age, nor could his family produce an acceptable successor; Sayid Ṭalib with his past record and cynically unscrupulous character was more feared than accepted; a Turkish prince, probably Burhan al-Din, suggested in some quarters of Baghdad or Kirkuk, could scarcely be welcome to the British Government; the Agha Khan, gravely proposed, could not be a serious candidate, and the Wali of Pusht-i-Kuh still less; the Shaykh of Muhammara, a self-proposed pretender, was unthinkable, and the Najdi Amir, 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn Sa'ud, scarcely less so. But the Amir Faysal was now available. His candidature had been suggested by A. T.

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Wilson in July 1920, when Damascus fell to the French; and Colonel K. Cornwallis, an ex-Sudan officer and Arabist who had served in Syria with Fayṣal and gained his close friendship, had been authorized by Curzon in December to offer him the 'Iraq throne. The Prince had refused it, alleging the higher claim of the Amir 'Abdullah, his elder brother. But to the king-seekers of Cairo he remained the only tolerable choice, and a programme whereunder his candidature and election should proceed was forthwith elaborated. The rôle of Great Britain was to encourage him to visit 'Iraq and offer himself as King, and thereafter to 'raise no objection' to his election; but while no forcible imposition was contemplated, such an experiment could, it was evident, scarcely be allowed to fail.

Regarding the Kurds, no decision was reached. It was already clear that the Kurdish State visualized at Sèvres would never exist, and that the Treaty itself had been rendered inoperative by Kamal's unimagined national revival in Turkey. The Kurds of Mosul, Kirkuk, and Sulaymaniya, too obviously unfit for self-government, might yet be ill at ease in an Arab State; but the High Commissioner's willingness in that event to govern them directly did not appeal to the 'Iraqi ministers, in whose view the Kurds must form an integral part of 'Iraq. No expedient remained but that which was tacitly accepted, both in Cairo and on the spot: to admit the distinctness of Kurd from Arab by a measure of administrative variation, to treat them with sympathy, and to hope for their ultimate willing adhesion to the 'Iraq State, to which in any case they could not but be economically united. Kirkuk had in fact accepted a Mutaṣarrif in February 1921, and Arbil became a sub-liwā of it under a Deputy Mutaṣarrif; Mosul since the murder of December 1920 remained under a British Political Officer, though unity with 'Iraq had been accepted. Sulaymaniya liwā refused, for the moment, any rule but that of the High Commissioner.

Important decisions were reached at Cairo on defence questions. The British forces were to be further reduced; the Royal Air Force was in 1922 to take over control from the Army. The Levies, increased by the addition not of further Arab but of Assyrian and Kurdish units, were to be handed over by the Minister of the Interior to the High Commissioner and therefrom later to the British Military Command, which would support the expenses of the force.

The Cairo Conference broke up on 25 March. Cox was back in Baghdad by mid-April, to find that the selection of a ruler now dominated all political thought. The lesser local candidates faded from the picture. The Naqib, whose own following was

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the terms of Mandates. Cox's intention had been to convene a Constituent Assembly for the King's election, but this must lead to a delay of some months, during which the possibility of an extremist coup d'état—no good beginning for a constitutional reign—could not be ignored. It was decided to shorten the procedure. On 11 July, a few days after Philby had left a service from whose policy he differed, the Council of Ministers passed a resolution declaring the Amir to be King of 'Iraq 'provided that His Highness's Government shall be constitutional, representative, and liberal and limited by law.' Accepting the resolution, Cox declared that to obtain due validity it must be confirmed by popular consent evoked by referendum.

This was held late in July. The formula of approval provided by the Government was in some liwās modified or supplemented, and in one words were added demanding complete freedom from foreign control; in another, a Constituent Assembly within three months was demanded. Mosul declarations, generally favourable, spoke of safeguarding Kurdish and other minority rights. Euphrates liwās asked for continued British control. The Kurds of Sulaymaniya abstained from voting. Kirkuk rejected, but Arbil accepted, the Amir. But on the whole a large majority—substantially less, it may be, than the 96 per cent. claimed officially—accepted the new King, and such leading tribesmen as ibn Hadhdhal of the 'Amarat and 'Ali Sulayman of the Dulaym offered their oaths of allegiance even before the enthronement.

Whitehall's last-minute and remarkably maladroit instruction that the Amir, in his very speech of acceptance of the throne, should emphasize the ultimate authority of the High Commissioner, was fortunately withdrawn. No further obstacles remained to the official enthronement. It took place with due ceremony in the early morning of 23 August 1921, at the height of the summer heat, in the Saray courtyard in Baghdad. Faysal I ruled in 'Iraq, inheriting from Sir Percy Cox the official headship of the State.

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643 considerable but heterogeneous, had no personal ambition and veered gradually from an attitude of opposition to one of support for a Sharifian ruler, since the British seemed so to desire. The foreign candidates other than Faysal made no general appeal. The conduct of Sayid Ṭalib in Interior, with his many unguarded remarks and profuse expenditure of public money, seemed to indicate a determination somehow to secure the throne, either immediately or as successor to the Naqib. His increasingly intemperate attitude could not be longer ignored; a personality which could have been valuable to 'Iraq, and had been so in fact during the bad days of 1920, seemed too likely to be used for selfish and dangerous ends. After the Pasha had, at a dinner party, threatened to mobilize and use tribal forces in their thousands 'to prevent British influence being used in favour of one of the candidates' (that is, Faysal), Cox thought it expedient to have him removed from the scene. He was arrested by the military authorities and deported to Ceylon. The attitude of the High Commission and of British officers in the Government became more openly favourable to the cause of the Sharifian Amir; Philby, Ṭalib's intimate, remained staunchly republican. The expected general amnesty for political prisoners was published on 30 May.

The Amir, synchronizing his arrangements with the British plan, left Jidda with Cornwallis and a small party of supporters on 12 June. Friendly telegrams were exchanged with the Naqib, and even with a possible opponent, 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn Sa'ud. Cox suggested to the public of 'Iraq, by communiqué on 17 June, that the British Government would, in the best interests of Iraq, 'place no obstacle in the way' of the election of a Sharifian ruler. Organized by the Naqib and the Mayor of Baghdad, a strong reception committee from the capital proceeded to Baṣra. At this city, which had recently petitioned Cox for a separate and half-independent régime, the Amir's reception on 23 June was reasonably cordial. At the Euphrates towns, especially Karbalā and Najf, it was tepid, but at Baghdad enthusiastic. The Amir's own personality and attitude were, it was soon obvious, his greatest assets, and won him support even from previous partisans of the Naqib or Sayid Ṭalib. He gained ground everywhere. The question became one scarcely of the probability, but only of the mode of his election and enthronement.

It would have been unreasonable and in practice irrelevant to await a second and still distant peace treaty with the ex-suzerain, Turkey, or to prolong exchanges of views with the interested Governments of France and of India. It was possible also to pass over the complaints of the United States spokesmen at Geneva, that their Government had been less than properly consulted on

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V

THE 'IRAQ KINGDOM

I. A REIGN BEGINS

643 THE new King was to reign in 'Iraq for twelve years. Aged 36 at the time of his accession, he possessed unusual qualities of dignity, leadership, and sympathy; and his political adroitness, which reflected a high intelligence used always devotedly, sometimes perilously, in the service of his adopted country, enabled him and it to survive grave dangers and to establish, in so few years, the structure of a State both more imposing and more promising than most observers could have expected. The British decision to encourage the candidature of this dethroned and non-'Iraqi prince for the 'Iraq throne had contained, indeed, the seeds of many blessings for that country.

The King's family joined him at Baghdad from Mecca. His young half-brother the Amir Zayd, then aged 21, was earliest with him, before going, a year later, to spend three years at Oxford. The material surroundings of a throne were soon, humbly enough, provided, and the royal figure became the unquestioned centre of all 'Iraqi political and social life. His name was used in the Khuṭba—official prayers—on and after his first Friday as King. By his tours in all areas and his accessibility he quickly became known to thousands of his subjects; indeed, no contributions made by Faysal were greater or more personal than his equal appeal to town and tribe—a reflection of his own half-urban half-desert background and education—and his power (which at moments failed him) to balance the forces of extreme 'Iraqi nationalism with the exigencies of the British connexion. His relations with the High Commission—now established on the Tigris right bank, physically and officially separated from the Government of 'Iraq across the river—and with the British element inevitably preponderant in Government during the early months, were cordial and appreciative, though his 'Iraqi entourage contained, as was soon to appear, some elements of a less realistic or more fanatical nationalism, which could be damaging. Cornwallis, Adviser to the Ministry of the Interior since August 1921, acted also as the King's personal Adviser.

642 The constitutional position of the territory was yet singularly unclear. Its elements were a Turkish sovereignty still existing, though dormant: an unratified Mandate, accepted by Great Britain but unwelcome to 'Iraq itself: a constitutional monarchy,

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645 new Ministry, formed early in November 1932, was viewed without enthusiasm by the moderates and with disdain by the Ikhā. Its programme, the usual list of impeccable and largely unrealizable objectives, did little to consolidate it; and Naji Shawkat decided to provide it with greater parliamentary support by a general election. The 'Ahd Party of Nuri Sa'id was allowed to die.

666 The elections, boycotted in vain by Abu al-Timman's party, produced a reasonably representative Chamber willing to support Naji's Government; and this in turn was prepared to exchange its provisional character for one of permanence. But the opening of the Extraordinary Session of Parliament on 3 March 1933 revealed it as evocative of small enthusiasm, exposed to strong Ikhā attacks, and unadapted to meet the King's desire for an all-party Ministry which should include all his outstanding statesmen. Naji Shawkat, pleading ill-health, resigned.

645 661 The formation of a Government under Rashid 'Āli, in the presence of a Chamber just elected with an anti-Ikhā majority, well illustrated the paradoxical but habitual relationship between 'Iraqi Cabinets and Parliament. The rank and file of the Deputies, elected as supporters of White, would complacently sustain Black; their seats rather than any body of principles were at stake. Rashid 'Āli began by demanding freedom to move for Treaty revision, but was persuaded by the King—who used, it was said, the threat of abdication itself—to renounce this; and on 20 March 1933 he announced a Cabinet which, with himself as Premier, included Yasin Pasha in the Ministry of Finance, Hikmat Sulayman in that of Interior, Nuri Sa'id in Foreign Affairs, Rustum Ḥaydar in Works, Jalal Baban in Defence, 'Abbas Mahdi in Education, and a lawyer new to ministerial rank, Muḥammad Zaki al-Baṣri, in Justice.

645 668 The new Government, hailed as one of genuine national co-operation and quick to publish an admirable programme of reform, had nevertheless lost the support of the nationalists by its weakening on the Treaty issue. A manifesto issued by these in June denounced the Government, and signs appeared that this resentment, in the dangerous councils of Najf and the Euphrates, could take a sectarian colouring and, by insistence on Shi'i demands, could represent a menace to security; once again a single element in the State was not unwilling to invoke tribal violence to coerce a newly established Government of National Unity. The tragic events of August 1933 were, however, to save the Ikhā Government from this danger by temporarily uniting all 'Iraq in their favour as saviours of the nation.

643 The King, invited to England on a well-timed State visit, left his son the Amir Ghazi, now aged twenty-one, as Regent. He

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arrived in London on 20 June accompanied by three ministers, Yasin Pasha, Nuri Sa'id, and Rustum Haydar. The visit was completely successful. The King, after his stay at Buckingham Palace, visited Scotland and Devonshire, then spent some days in London and some in Switzerland. But his health appeared to be seriously affected by the strains of the last twenty years, and he would willingly have rested for a further period in Europe, had not grave events recalled him urgently to Baghdad.

These events arose from the small, alien, unhappy Assyrian community of whose dilemma and attempted settlement much has been said in these pages. The Mar Sham'un, who spent the last six months of 1932 at Geneva but could accomplish nothing, returned in January 1933 to his restless and divided flock. Assyrian Levy officers, notably Yaqu son of Isma'il, had conducted a strong campaign in the Mar Sham'un's favour in the Dohuk–'Amadiya area. The 'Iraqi authorities had, on the contrary, weakened his prestige by their strict limitation of his powers to the spiritual field, and their treatment of Assyrians as normal members of the public. A strong anti-Patriarchal faction led by a Malik Khoshaba, with bishops and other Maliks, had secured the appointment of Khoshaba himself as President of the Advisory Committee for land settlement. The Mar Sham'un on his return, with his position weakened and all prospect of national migration or local consolidation dissipated, assumed an attitude of total refusal to co-operate with the Government-sponsored settlement, to conduct which the expected 'foreign expert', Major Thompson, arrived in Mosul in May 1933. The Patriarch, not content with spreading false suggestions regarding the settlement itself, threatened excommunication to any Assyrian who might participate in it; he was ready, some observers could not but feel, to sacrifice the interests of the community to the claims of his personal or hierarchical ambitions and resentments. In Mosul city Muslim-Assyrian feeling showed no improvement. An incident of stone-throwing at the windows of 'Iraqi Army officers was attributed to the Assyrians.

The Minister of Interior, Hikmat Sulayman, at this point wisely invited the Mar Sham'un to Baghdad, hoping for a personal understanding. But the antagonism was irremovable. The Minister, intelligibly if perhaps on the broadest view needlessly, bade his visitor surrender all claims to temporal power, even in the form urged by the Patriarch, which was that of adherence to the 'traditional customs of his people'. The Mar Sham'un addressed a letter full of complaints to the King on the eve of his departure for Europe, accusing both 'Iraqis and British of persecution. Three weeks of vain conversations and waiting ended with irritation on both sides and the order of Hikmat Sulayman on 24 June that the

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accepting it. From Cyprus he continued to bombard the League of Nations with petitions.

The return of Sir Francis Humphrys to Baghdad on 23 August, with the realization that no British pro-Assyrian intervention was imminent, gave some relief, not least to the uneasy but defiant Cabinet. The tension and emotion of mid-August gradually died down. Then, on 8 September, the news reached Baghdad that King Faysal, with King 'Ali, Nuri Sa'id, and Rustum Haydar at his bedside, had died suddenly of heart failure at Berne.

3. THE HASHIMI MINISTRY

The shock of this irreparable loss, dramatically sudden and coinciding with a wave of ungrateful depreciation, transformed public opinion in an hour. The late King regained, and deservedly, all his place in 'Iraqi esteem: esteem which was indicated, on the arrival of his body from Trieste and Haifa on 14 September, by a funeral without precedent in 'Iraq in its expression of nation-wide grief. His services had indeed been beyond price to the State of which he was both the spirit and the embodiment; and in days to come they were to prove irreplaceable. None could take his place as balancer of forces, nor preserve his equal relations with his own extremists and with the British, with town intelligentsia and with wild tribesmen; none could control, by personal prestige, the ruling class and its factious ministers. Many of the troubles of the period from 1933 to 1941 would, it may be, have been avoided if his wisdom and experience had been spared to the 'Iraq State for those years.

The heir apparent, succeeding to the throne as Ghazi I, swore his oath of office, exchanged telegrams with King George V, and received the resignation of the Cabinet. He was twenty-one. Active, warmly patriotic, and not unamiable, he was popular with the public and with the young 'Iraqi officers with whom, after an unsuccessful period at Harrow, he had been educated; but his lack of intellectual equipment and of interest in public affairs, and his devotion to pleasure and to sport, forbade the hope that he would prove adequate to the royal functions in 'Iraq.

Rashid 'Ali Gaylani, reinstated as Premier without change of ministers, could profit by the Sunni–Shi'i peace which, following the Assyrian crisis, had descended upon the Euphrates, and from the return of Anglo-'Iraqi relations to normal after the savage press attacks and public demonstrations of August. But, whatever his past commitments, he could not now do other than reaffirm 'Faysal's policy', which was that of the Treaty and friendship with Great Britain. Abu al-Timman's Nationalist Party, persistent even in these circumstances, issued on the third day of the new reign

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confessions made by alleged participants, death sentences were passed on five of the accused, including Hikmat, and long terms of imprisonment on others, while some were acquitted. The commutation of the death sentence for one of imprisonment on four of the condemned was soon afterwards announced by Royal Irada; that of Hikmat Sulayman was mitigated only after persuasive pressure by the British Ambassador and by private British as well as 'Iraqi friends. There remained—and remain today—among persons well qualified to judge, many who, in spite of the confessions, believed and believe the whole plot to be fictitious and its 'discovery' designed merely to serve political or personal ends.

A part of the objects of the alleged conspiracy was after all to be achieved, and this by a tragic accident. The King, driving his car with habitual recklessness late in the night of 3 April, crashed into an electric-power standard near his palace, and died a few hours later of the severe fractures of the skull which he had sustained. The announcement of his death was made early on the 4th. The Council of Ministers, urgently convened, received the written testimony of Queen 'Aliya that Ghazi had wished to be succeeded, should the case ever arise during the infancy of his son, by a Regency of his first cousin, the Amir 'Abd al-Ilah, son of the late King 'Ali. A sufficient number of members of the dissolved Chamber were gathered to ratify this in accordance with the Constitution; and the succession of King Faysal II, then aged almost four years, and the Regency of the Amir were proclaimed.

King Ghazi was twenty-seven. He had reigned for nearly six years. Little interested in the formal functions of his office, and barely persuaded to fulfil them, his faults of heedlessness and frivolity, his impatience of protocol and of advice, had been embarrassing to his successive Governments, and at times discourteous to his subjects. But at his best he lacked neither intelligence nor charm. He was a good sportsman, a brilliant high-speed motor driver, and popular with the young Army officers who were his chosen and natural associates. He was beloved, at a distance, by many of his subjects for his youth, vitality, and evident patriotism. The little Faysal II, attended always by an English nurse and later an English governness, was known to be an intelligent and attractive child. The new Regent, brother of Queen 'Aliya and uncle of the King, was now aged twenty-seven. He had been educated at Victoria College, Alexandria, and although hitherto unversed in public affairs was considered serious and intelligent, and likely to turn his personal charm and excellent social gifts to good account.

The King's funeral at the Royal Mausoleum was attended by many Arab visitors from abroad and by tens of thousands of his

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own subjects. It evoked extraordinary emotion. The fantastic story that his death had been 'arranged' by the British Secret Service was propagated by the German wireless, and perhaps also by Dr. Grobba. It was believed by the more feeble-minded part of the hysterical city mob, and was responsible for a shameful and brutal attack, immediately following a memorial service to King Ghazi, on the British Consul at Mosul, Mr. G. E. A. C. Monck-Mason. Surrounded by a rabble of excited demonstrators, he was stoned and then struck fatally on the head, on the veranda of his own Consulate. The Prime Minister, deeply afflicted by this outrage, offered apologies to the British Ambassador and ordered compensation to be paid to the Consul's widow. His funeral at Mosul was public and impressive; 'Iraqi officialdom and the Army were well represented. Severe sentences were passed on a small number of the participants in the attack, in which as usual students had been prominent; the murderer himself was not discovered.

3. FIRST MONTHS OF WAR

The five months preceding the outbreak of the Second World War were a period of outward tranquillity in 'Iraq. The King's funeral visitors returned home, the Regent settled to his task. The Sa'idi Ministry, resigning office on 4 April in accordance with the Constitution, was reinstated by Royal Irada two days later, without change of personnel. The Minister of Interior, Naji Shawkat, whose tepid support on the conspiracy case and on others had created a breach between him and the Premier, resigned late in April. Nuri Pasha himself took the portfolio of Interior, and brought 'Ali Jawdat to Foreign Affairs. The elections were completed in May, though martial law was still in force until August in Mosul and Baghdad. Parliament was opened by the Regent on 12 June. His Speech from the Throne appealed to all for tranquillity and restraint. Chosen by the habitual procedures, the Chamber included a large majority of Nuri Pasha's supporters and, contrary to all precedent, was destined for a life of four years. Nevertheless, the shadow of the Army still lay heavily over 'Iraqi politics, and the Chamber itself contained deputies enough willing to renew all the old animosities. Among them were followers of the German lead which was still ceaselessly offered, convinced Anglophobes still resentful of the 1930 Treaty and its alleged limitations on 'Iraqi freedom, thwarted members of the intelligentsia, and pan-Arabs bitter at the Palestine White Paper which 'Iraq, at this stage, rejected. The cause of the Palestinian Arabs was not visibly advanced by the journeys of the Prime Minister to 'Amman, Beirut, and Cairo in August, ever seeking a formula

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least some of her statesmen. Her delegates attended the Food Conference at Hot Springs in May 1943, and the Bretton Woods meeting on Currency and Exchange questions in August 1944, the resulting agreement being ratified by Parliament late next year. The meetings at Atlantic City and at Chicago on Trade and on Civil Aviation respectively included 'Iraqi spokesmen, as well as the more important Conference at San Francisco in April 1945 at which the bases of the United Nations organization were laid. It was attended by Arshad al-'Umari, Foreign Minister, accompanied by Nasrat al-Farsi, and by a young American-educated Shi'i official, Fadhil al-Jamali. The part taken by the delegation was creditable; but on the refusal of Arshad to subscribe to certain phraseology in the Charter (in which 'self-government' as distinct from 'independence' was given as the goal of countries under tutelage) Fadhil was authorized to sign instead, and his persistence cost Arshad his position as Foreign Minister. The World Security Charter was ratified by Parliament in October and in the Preparatory Commission which met in London late in the year the 'Iraqi charge d'affaires, Shakir al-Wadi, a former staff officer of Bakr Sidqi, represented his country. It was contemporary with the inaugural meeting of the United Nations Cultural and Educational Organization, also held in London, at which Dr. Naji al-Asil, now Director of Antiquities, was present.

The Regent, a developing personality, generally popular, keenly interested in affairs and willing to play his full part in them, was now exercising an influence on Government greater than any Palace influence since the death of Faysal I. The Administration, whose continuity he helped to ensure, kept the peace, allowed wide latitude to the press and the bitter tirades of the ex-internees, and played a leading part in the Arab Unity movement; but it did little for social reform and refused, until its last month of power, to authorize the formation of political parties now struggling to birth. The Regent's speech at the opening of Parliament in December 1945, however, foreshadowed a new policy in this regard by promising the readmission of parties, the development of 'true democracy', a greater measure of equality and social justice, and the training of a younger element of citizens for power. This speech, welcome to the eager and half-thwarted political world—and disturbing to the elderly and privileged—led to increased criticism of the Pachachi Ministry in Parliament, and to clashes between the left wing of Kamil al-Chadirchi and the extreme right, or ex-Nazi, following of Sami Shawkat. The latter now abandoned his appointment as Director-General of Social Affairs to form a National Revival Party. The Pachachi Ministry resigned at the end of January 1946.

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opposition leaders of various records and tendencies—Ṭaha al-Hashimi, Muzaḥim al-Pachachi, Muḥammad Riḍhā al-Shabibi, Naṣrat al-Farsi, 'Abd al-Hadi al-Ḍhahir, Ja'far Ḥamandi, and Ṣādiq Baṣṣam—were drawing together towards a fragile but imposing Popular Front whose formation with a vague programme they announced towards the middle of 1951. The National Democrat Party returned to full activity during 1950. There seemed, however, no reason why, with his parliamentary majority and with a personal authority which for years past had exceeded that of any other 'Iraqi, Nuri Sa'id should not, subject to unforeseeable changes and chances, remain in power as long as his health and restless nature might permit. In the last days of 1950 he brought 'Umar Nadhmi, Muḥammad Ḥasan al-Kubba, and Baṣṣam to the Cabinet as Ministers without portfolio, appointed 'Abd al-Majid Maḥmud, the Director of the Agricultural Bank, to the Ministry of Economics, moved Ḍhiya' Ja'far to Works, and retained 'Abd al-Wahhab Mirjan at Finance. But no real coalition had emerged, and internal politics showed no sign of rising above the habitual strife of rival personalities. A formidable range of unsolved problems, inter-Arab and international, political and financial, confronted Nuri Sa'id, none more conspicuously than those of Israel and the Palestine refugees, revision of the 1930 Treaty, and the extraction of greater oil profits. To these the veteran statesman now turned.

King Faysal II, whose fifteenth birthday fell on 2 May 1950, had completed his preparatory school days in England and since the spring of 1949 had been a happy and successful Harrow schoolboy. He was to attain his majority on 2 May 1953. His family had acquired a house near Staines where the Queen Mother 'Aliya spent most of the year. Her health, however, began to cause alarm in 1949 and after a long illness and operation she returned home to die in Baghdad in September 1950, aged only thirty-nine; a tragic loss to the King and to her devoted brother, the Regent.

4. WEALTH OF A NATION

There have been references on earlier pages to the serious position of the State finances in the period 1947–9 and to the substantial recovery therefrom by the end of 1950. It could be foreseen by the latter date that, so far from financial stringency, the resources at the Government's disposal would in future be ample not only for normal purposes of the public services as hitherto conceived but also for an expanding programme of development. Provided that control of expenditure were maintained as efficiently as it had been (except in 1948) in the past, which there was no reason to doubt: that the probity and efficiency of Government personnel did not deteriorate: that the efforts made to perfect the

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/For an account of the search for a ruler of Iraq after the First World War and of the accession of King Faisal in 1921, see category 116, pp. 303-337./

• GH3

H.M. KING GHAZI I

Frontpiece

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CHAPTER XVII

THE SEARCH FOR A RULER

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In the coffee houses, in the tents of the shaikhs, wherever 'Iraqīs met in social and political gatherings during the winter of 1920 and the spring of 1921, the question as to the form of the permanent Government and of the person of its ruler was constantly under discussion. The problem of the ruler, both to 'Iraqīs and to the responsible British officials in Baghdad and in Whitehall, was much the same as it had been just after the Armistice of Mudros: the discovery of an individual who would command the greatest support among the inhabitants of 'Iraq.

The desire on the part of H.M. Government to set up a ruler who had the support of the people, as reiterated by Lord Curzon in the House of Lords, June 25th, 1920, when he said: 'No announcement would be more welcome to us than a genuine and general expression of opinion in favour of a particular system or even of a particular ruler,'[1] was something more than mere platitude calculated to win the goodwill of the 'Iraqīs. A candidate possessing popular support and willing to co-operate with Great Britain in maintaining her interests was inherent in the pattern of the State which H.M. Government had in mind for 'Iraq which, in spite of the implications of its public declarations, was still an 'indigenous government' under 'effective and indisputable British control'.[2] Without such a head, clothed with executive authority and ostensibly supported by the people, no façade could exist behind which ultimate British control might function without the open employment of armed force. All negotiations, whether unilateral or bilateral, unsupported by public opinion, would fall to the ground for

[1] *Parl. Debates*, H. of L., 5th S., Vol. XL (1920), p. 880.
[2] Telegram, S/S for India to Political, Baghdad, February 14th, 1919, cited *supra*, pp. 180-1.

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lack of a contracting party, as occurred in the case of the Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1919, the Treaty of Sèvres, and as characterized by the early efforts of the French to set up a government in Syria.

No candidate who fulfilled these conditions had been revealed in the Acting Civil Commissioner's summary of 'Iraqī public opinion, in November, 1918,[1] or by the plebiscite of the winter of 1918-19, initiated and rigorously supervised by the Acting Civil Commissioner, who himself was bitterly opposed to an Arab Amīr. The plebiscite had revealed that while a strong desire for an Amīr existed, rival ambitions, local jealousies and lack of outstanding ability made it impossible for the country to settle on any one candidate.[2]

From that time, although the desire for an Amīr had steadily grown, the difficulty of settling on any single candidate had remained. One section of the ex-Turkish officials, practically all Sunnīs of Baghdad, afraid of being swamped by the Shī'a majority, was imbued with the idea that a Sunnī Turk, as found in the person of Prince Burhan ed-Dīn,[3] might better serve their interests than a local candidate or a Hāshimī known to be on comparatively friendly terms with the Shī'īs.[4] Opposing them, however, was an even larger element of ex-Turkish officials, both civil and military, concentrated largely in Baghdad, Mōsul and Kirkūk, who encouraged the belief, substantiated by persistent propaganda arising across the frontiers, that the return of the Turks was but a question of time.

Among the possible local candidates the Naqīb of Baghdad stood high, although his acceptance of the presidency of the Council and his seeming subservience to the British had earned the disapproval of the ardent Nationalists. In British circles, his great age, his feeble health and lack of suitable dynastic successors counted against him, although, according to members

[1] Telegram No. 10250, Political, Baghdad, to S/S for India, November 24th, 1918.
[2] *Supra*, pp. 172 ff.
[3] *Political Developments in Meso.*, p. 4.
[4] Bell, *Letters*, p. 585.

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of his family, the throne was offered him but under such conditions and limitations as would have made him, in his own words, no more than an ' 'Iraqī Rajah'. He himself did not seek the throne, although he felt that if it were freely offered him by the people he would be obliged to accept the honour and the duties.

Saiyid Talib Pasha of Basra, Minister of Interior, by his ability, his energy and his influence, was the most outstanding local candidate. Since his return from Egypt, where he had rendered valuable services to the Allies in arousing the Arabs against the Turks, he had continued to work as before the war for 'Iraqī Nationalism. He had, however, stopped short of advocating violence to eject the British and during the Insurrection he had rendered further services to the British Authorities, both as intermediary with the insurgents and as Chairman of the Electoral Law Committee. His enemies maintained, nevertheless, that, as in the days of the Turks, his activities were directed primarily towards furthering his own ambitions. Indeed, he freely admitted to the High Commissioner his expectations of becoming Amīr of 'Iraq, which, he predicted in February, 1921, would be accomplished by the autumn of the same year. So great was the alarm and opposition aroused by Saiyid Talib Pasha that any original intention the High Commissioner may have had of using him as head of either provisional or permanent Government[1] was effectually checked by the knowledge that if Saiyid Talib had many followers who professed their willingness to die on his behalf, there were others who would go to the same lengths to prevent him from becoming head of the State.[2] The High Commissioner's disapproval of Saiyid Talib's activities was not lessened

[1] Bell, *Letters*, p. 562.

[2] Much of the reluctance of Sasūn Effendi and others to support the provisional Government, has been explained by the fear that the British Government intended to support Talib Pasha. Ja'far Pasha is stated to have said in private that 'If he had not hesitated to enter the Cabinet, it was only with the object of defeating Talib Pasha, whose ambitions he regarded as a menace to the country'. *Political Developments in Meso.*, p. 4.

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

H.M. KING FAISAL

[facing p. 306]

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by the knowledge that the Nationalists in many quarters regarded him as the one strong candidate able to oppose the British nor by the fact that his propaganda was ostensibly in favour of the Naqīb into whose place he expected to fall if the Naqīb refused the honour or when his death left it vacant.

Other candidates had been mentioned. The Shaikh of Mohammerah, whose name had been put forward in 1918-19, again announced his candidature on April 5th in a letter to the High Commissioner. Ibn Sa'ūd was also proposed, largely, it was believed in official circles, to offset the possible success of the sons of the Sharīf of Mecca, of whom both 'Abdullāh and Faisal were freely mentioned. The Agha Khan[1] and even the *Walī* of Push ti-Kuh were also suggested. In some circles, the possibility of a republic was also discussed.

Sentiment in favour of a Sharifian ruler had not been lacking in 'Iraq at the end of the war, as the Acting Civil Commissioner had noted in November, 1918,[2] and as the plebiscite had confirmed.[3] At that time it had been vigorously opposed by the Acting Civil Commissioner and by those who held the same opinions on the Arab question. His efforts to exclude and to counter Hāshimī influence, whether engendered locally or in London, as in Colonel T. E. Lawrence's proposal to divide Arab-Asia into four Hāshimī kingdoms under British influence,[4] had been negatived not only by H.M. Government but also by the efforts of the 'Iraqīs themselves. The establishment of the Arab Government at Damascus under British aegis and the activities of the 'Iraqī officers in Syria, in 1919 and 1920, to induce and finally to force Great Britain to keep her promises concerning 'Iraq, had, as already indicated[5] encouraged 'Iraqī Nationalism and, after the election of Sharīf 'Abdullāh as King

[1] For the comments of the Agha Khan on the situation in 'Iraq in 1920, see Haldane, op. cit., pp. 4-5.

[2] Telegram, No. 10250, November 24th, 1918.

[3] Three declarations, the most secured by any candidate, had demanded a son of the Sharīf of Mecca. See *supra*, p. 172.

[4] Telegram, S/S for India, to Political, Baghdad, November 18th, 1918.

[5] *Supra*, Ch. x, xiii.

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175x 727x 643 of 'Iraq, had stimulated sentiment on behalf of the Sharīf. The fall of the Arab Government in Syria and the flight of Faisal had taken the wind temporarily from Sharifian sails, as at Mōsul, where the agitation in favour of a Hāshimī candidate had subsided precipitately.[1] The sentiment had rapidly revived, however. By late December, the Shī'a *'Ulamā* were credited with saying 'The country will not be content until complete independence, under a son of the Sharīf, is achieved'. Much of the support of the Shī'īs who, in particular, seemed in favour of a son of the Sharīf,[2] was due, it was held officially, to the fact that they believed that Sharīf Husain, generally known to be of liberal religious views, was secretly a member of their sect. The Sharifian officers returning to 'Iraq in early 1921 had also given an impetus to public opinion in favour of a Hāshimī, although they were divided among themselves over the respective merits of 'Abdullāh and Faisal.

The movement towards a Hāshimī was not hindered by the knowledge that a number of the British officials, including the Adviser to the Minister of Justice, the Oriental Secretary and the Private Secretary to the High Commissioner, in private conversations had advocated a Hāshimī and Faiṣal in particular. As early as November, 1920, Miss Gertrude Bell wrote, as she had already urged upon the Acting Civil Commissioner in the previous July, that the only solution in her opinion was a son of the Sharīf for whom, she believed, the Constituent Assembly when convened, would ask.[3] A little later, she again wrote: 'I feel quite clear in my own mind that there is only one workable solution, a son of the Sharif, and, for choice, Faiṣal: very much the first choice.'[4] The necessity for rapid action in setting up a king to check adverse currents against the new Government, she also recognized, as when she wrote: 'I believe if we could put up a son of the Sharif at once he might

[1] *Admin. Report, Mosul*, 1920, pp. 3-4.
[2] See letters cited *supra*, p. 261.
[3] Bell, op. cit., p. 574. [4] Ibid., p. 581.

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yet sweep the board; if we hesitate the tide of public opinion may turn overwhelmingly to the Turks. . . .'[1]

The High Commissioner had maintained, however, the strictly official view that the provisional Government had been established with the aim of providing machinery whereby the wishes of the people as to the form of the permanent Government and the person of the ruler might be freely expressed. The plan, involving delay, found critics even among the 'Iraqis.

'You British wish to build the Government of 'Iraq in the usual solid English fashion,' an 'Iraqī high official, with a reputation for sagacity and insight, is reported to have said to Miss Bell at a dinner in the winter of 1920-1. 'You want to begin with the foundations and then follow with the walls, the roof and then the decorations. That is not my idea of the way to build now for 'Iraq.'

'What do you mean?' he was asked.

'Begin with a roof, supported by a few pillars. The roof will encourage us to continue. Otherwise the slowness of building may discourage us. Give us a king. He will be our roof and we will work downwards.'

From the events of the next few months it would seem that both the British officials in Baghdad, including the High Commissioner, and H.M. Government came to the same conclusion: that the roof could not wait for the walls and that the head of the permanent State must be installed before convoking the Assembly. The Assembly came to be considered as a body which was to ratify the choice by H.M. Government of a ruler and to approve of the steps which had already been taken by the provisional Government under British guidance.

Among the members of the Interdepartmental Committee in London, a Hāshimī candidate found the most favour, although the Naqīb and Saiyid Talib Pasha each had their supporters. Lord Curzon, although he strongly disapproved of the action of the 'Iraqī Covenanters in Damascus in March,

[1] Bell, op. cit., p. 585.

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1920, had come to regard 'Abdullāh as the prospective Amīr of 'Iraq. He had demurred, therefore, at the proposal which the Acting Civil Commissioner had telegraphed following the collapse of the Syrian Government. The telegram, in part, was as follows:

> 'Will His Majesty's Government consider possibility of offering him Amirate of Mesopotamia? Objections entertained on this side to creation of Amirate have hitherto been primarily that no suitable person could be found. We have always regarded Faisal as booked for Syria. Nothing that I have heard during the last few months has led me to modify my views of unsuitability of 'Abdullah and our experience of last few weeks in Baghdad makes it fairly clear that no local candidate will be successful in obtaining sufficient support here to enable him to make good.'[1]

Mr. Montagu, on behalf of the India Office, had favourably received the suggestion, but it was dropped[2] in deference to Lord Curzon and to the Quai d'Orsay which made it clear that Amīr Faisal's 'employment in Mesopotamia immediately after his expulsion from Syria, would be regarded by French opinion as an unfriendly act'.[3]

Lord Curzon in the following months experienced a change of heart. Once the provisional Government was well under way he adopted, with the approval of the Middle East Committee, the policy of installing Faisal in 'Iraq.

On December 17th, Lord Curzon, as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on Middle East Affairs, deputed Colonel Kinahan Cornwallis, then attached to the Foreign Office, to call on the same day upon Amīr Faisal, who was then in London, and to offer him the throne of 'Iraq. Colonel Cornwallis had been in close touch with Arab affairs in general and had been closely

[1] Cited Wilson, Sir A. T., *Mesopotamia*, 1917-1920, p. 306.

[2] Nevertheless, Sharīf 'Abdullāh felt it necessary to deny in October, 1920, in *Al-Fallāh* (Mecca) that Faisal would take his place in 'Iraq.

[3] Telegram No. 1539, India Office to Viceroy, Simla, for Sir Percy Cox, September 10th, 1920.

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associated with Amīr Faisal in Damascus, where a close personal friendship had developed.[1]

Not until one o'clock in the morning, after the Amīr had returned from the theatre, did the interview take place. The offer from the Foreign Office was met with refusal although the conversation lasted until after three o'clock. Faisal remained obdurate. The throne, he declared, belonged to his brother 'Abdullāh and he, Faisal, could not and would not accept it.

Shortly afterwards, Colonel T. E. Lawrence was asked to approach Sharīf 'Abdullāh and to attempt to remove his objections to the installation of his younger brother in 'Iraq. Amīr 'Abdullāh has since stated that Colonel Lawrence went so far as to offer him a kingdom in Syria if he would renounce the throne of 'Iraq and that, on the basis of the promise, he, 'Abdullāh, was gathering his forces preparatory to taking over his kingdom when the British Government intervened, in February, 1921, and compelled him to accept only the southern portion of his brother's former kingdom, the Amirate of Kerak or Transjordan.[2]

Following the report by Colonel Lawrence that Sharīf 'Abdullāh would offer no serious objections to the proposal that Faisal should take his place in 'Iraq,[3] Amīr Faisal was again approached. The conversations were continued after the conduct of 'Iraq affairs fell to the new Middle East Department, created in the early spring of 1921 through the initiative of Mr. Winston Churchill, who was transferred from the War Office to the Colonial Office for the purpose.[4] By the time of

[1] Later Personal Adviser to King Faisal, 1921-33, and Adviser to Minister of Interior, 'Iraq, 1921-35.

[2] Colonel Lawrence was non-committal regarding this statement by Amīr Abdullāh. A search through his papers after his death revealed no reference to the episode.

[3] 'Abdullāh, however, held it against Faisal for a number of years that he had usurped the crown which was his ('Abdullāh's) by right.

[4] Mr. Churchill had formulated his plans for the Department by the middle of January (*Parl. Debates*, H. of C., 5th S., Vol. CLI (1921), p. 268), but did not go from the War Office to the Colonial Office until February 14th. The Department formally assumed supervision of Middle East Affairs, March 2nd. *Colonial Office List*, 1921, p. 448.

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the Cairo Conference in March, most of the outstanding points between H.M. Government and the Amīr had been settled. It remained for the Cairo Conference to confirm his candidature and to outline the procedure by which he was to be installed in 'Iraq.

The Cairo Conference, March 12th-24th, 1921

The Middle East Division of the Colonial Office had owed its creation to the necessity of devising a less costly British policy for the Near and Middle East and of replacing by unified control the complicated and cumbersome system of divided authority among the Foreign, the India and the Colonial Offices.[1] Mr. Churchill, in taking charge of Near and Middle East affairs, was faced, on the one hand, by the insistent demand of the British public for a radical reduction in expenditure[2] and, on the other hand, by the necessity, with which his whole political creed was in sympathy, of maintaining and consolidating the territorial gains and the strategical vantage points won in the East as the result of a vast outlay of British blood and treasure. To aid in formulating new lines of procedure in order to achieve these ends, he called a conference of the principal political and military officials of the areas concerned to meet in Cairo on March 12th, 1921.[3]

The questions considered by the Conference included as problems concerning 'Iraq: the immediate reduction of British expenditure with the consequent revision of policy involving (*a*) the future relationship of the new State to Great Britain;

[1] *Parl. Debates*, H. of C., 5th S., Vol. CXLIII (1921), p. 268.

[2] Ibid., Vol. CXXVII (1920), pp. 644-5; Vol. CXXX (1920), pp. 2223-84; H. of L., Vol. XL (1920), pp. 848-94; *The Times*, April 5th, 1921, May 9th, 1921; *The Daily Telegraph*, June 25th, 1920.

[3] The representatives of 'Iraq who were summoned to the Conference were: the High Commissioner, accompanied by Sir Aylmer Haldane, K.C.M.G., K.C.B., the Commander-in-Chief; Sasūn Effendi, Minister of Finance; Ja'far Pasha, C.M.G., D.S.O., Minister of Defence; Maj.-Gen. E. H. de Vere Atkinson, C.B., C.M.G., C.I.E., Adviser to the Ministry of Works; Lt.-Col. S. H. Slater, C.I.E., Financial Adviser; Miss Gertrude Bell, C.B.E., Oriental Secretary.

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(b) the person of the future ruler of 'Iraq; and (c) the nature and composition of the defence forces of the new State which was to assume an increasing share of its own defence. The status of the Kurdish regions in their relations to 'Iraq was also discussed.

It was apparent, in view of the decreasing revenue, of falling agricultural prices and of the large burdens to be assumed in taking over the Railways, the Port of Basra and other public works from the Army at the latter's own valuation, that the prospects were not bright for the immediate assumption by the new State of the cost of its defence. Anticipating a discussion of the question, vital from the British standpoint, at Cairo, the High Commissioner after consultation with Sir Aylmer Haldane and the Minister of Defence had, nevertheless, formulated proposals involving substantial saving for the ensuing year and further reductions in the future, consequent on 'Iraq assuming an increasing share in the responsibilities hitherto devolving on Great Britain.[1] Mr. Churchill was thus able to announce a preliminary reduction of the original estimate of British expenditure in the Middle East for 1921-2, from £35,000,000 to £27,500,000, a figure which was expected to fall to nine or ten million pounds in 1922-3.[2] The reduction in the British budget, however, necessitated a stipulation that the 'Iraq budget should provide not less than 55 lacs for the National Army, the strength of which should eventually amount to 15,000 men, and that ordinarily her contributions to defence should not fall below 15 per cent of her revenue,[3] a proportion later increased to 25 per cent.[4]

[1] Cox, Sir P. Z, 'Historical Summary' in Bell, op. cit., p. 531.

[2] *Parl. Debates*, H. of C., 5th S., Vol. CXLIII (1921), p. 271. Also ibid., Vol. CLI (1922), p. 1547. The actual expenditures in 'Iraq by the British Treasury, 1920-5 have been stated to be (ibid., Vol. CXCII (1926), p. 4):

1920-1	£32,000,000	1923-4	£5,740,358
1921-2	£23,355,950	1924-5	£4,479,754
1922-3	£7,807,384	1925-6	£4,118,400

[3] *Admin. Report*, 1920-1922, p. 25.

[4] Article IV of Military Agreement and Article IV of Financial Agreement, subsidiary to the Treaty with King Faisal, October 10th, 1922, Cmd. 2120.

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SEARCH FOR A RULER

In order to enable the High Commissioner to achieve the proposed economies for the relief of the British taxpayer, the Conference agreed that until the 'Iraqī Army could be recruited, equipped and trained, the Levies should be increased from 4000 to 7500 and that they were to be financed by H.M. Government and to be administered by the High Commissioner. The Levies, hitherto, had been composed for the most part of Arabs, with a small number of Kurds. Assyrians were now to be recruited.[1] In addition, six squadrons of the Air Force, stationed at strategic points, were to assume responsibility for the maintenance of order.[2]

The success of the proposed withdrawal of British troops from 'Iraq depended almost entirely on the creation and maintenance of friendly relations between the 'Iraqīs and the Mandatory Power, which had been temporarily improved by the establishment of the provisional Government. The continuance of strong Nationalist agitation, however, directed against the Mandate on the ground that the relationship which it created had no basis either in British promises or in Arab Nationalism, seemed to indicate that the mandatory regime, as originally conceived and outlined in the draft document, could not be imposed without prolonged military occupation on a scale which British public opinion rendered impossible. The mere prospect of increased hostility, leading inevitably in the absence of adequate military forces in the country to disturbances similar to those of 1920 or even worse, would not only paralyse the efforts of British officials to apply the Mandate and to develop the country but would also lead to an irresistible renewal of British public opinion for the complete evacuation of a country where the game was not worth the candle.

It had already been suggested to H.M. Government, in May, 1920, by Mr. Montagu, that if Nationalist agitation were to

[1] *Admin. Report*, 1920-1922, pp. 44-5.
[2] Sassoon, Rt. Hon. Sir Philip, *J. C. Asian Soc.*, Vol. xx (1933), p. 399.

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be cut at its roots and if a friendly government co-operating with Great Britain were to be established in 'Iraq, a further step in defining the relations between the two countries might be necessary.[1] This step would consist of an attempt to satisfy national aspirations by disguising the relationship, sanctioned under the terms of the mandatory document then already in existence, by means of a treaty of alliance. Lord Curzon, who had difficulty in agreeing with Mr. Montagu on any subject, had rejected the suggestion at the time. Mr. Churchill took up the idea, all his conversations with Amīr Faisal being conducted on the basis of negotiating a treaty similar to that between Great Britain and Egypt, which would establish Faisal as King of an independent State in alliance with Great Britain. Under such a treaty, the scope of British authority might be more restricted than originally projected, but under skilful handling, the ultimate authority could be made not less effective. It would have the added merit of enabling Great Britain to maintain with less expense her position before the League of Nations without sacrificing her Imperial interests.

When Mr. Churchill arrived at Cairo for the Conference, he had made up his mind that Faisal was the only possible candidate with whom such a treaty might be negotiated. In agreement with him were Sir Percy Cox and many friends and supporters of the Amir at the Conference: T. E. Lawrence, Miss Bell, Ja'far Pasha, H. W. Young, and others. Amīr Faisal's high birth, as a son of Husain, Sharīf of Mecca and King of the Hijāz, assured his position among Arabs in general and gave his person a sanctity among the religiously minded, even among the Shī'īs. He possessed experience in the ways of men and in diplomatic usage gleaned from his early life among the Turks at Istanbul, from his sojourn in the desert in the days of peace and of war against the Turks, from his participation at the Peace Conference at Versailles and from his brief day as King at Damascus. Among the Nationalists, his early

[1] Young, Major Sir H. W., op. cit., p. 313.

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espousal of the Arab cause in Syria,[1] his leadership of the Arab forces in the Hijāz and in Syria and his election as the first Arab ruler of Damascus since the Ummayads, secured his standing as an Arab patriot. His personality and his character which had won and were to continue to win the affection of British officials with whom he associated, were expected to gain the adherence of the 'Iraqis among whom a strong sentiment in his favour already existed.

His short-lived kingship at Damascus, it was believed, had revealed to him the difficulties of a purely Arab administration and the danger of relying entirely on an Arab army.[2] British advice and assistance to the new kingdom would, therefore, it was hoped, be welcomed for their own sake and be regarded not merely as onerous conditions imposed by the Power which had given him his throne.

As a secondary consideration, it was felt that Faisal's nomination would, in part, redeem the promises made during the war to the Sharīf in particular and to the Arabs in general and thus rehabilitate British prestige in the Arab world. It would, in addition, mitigate Faisal's bitterness against the British Government for what he believed to be its responsibility in his overthrow at Damascus.[3]

Mr. Churchill believed, moreover, that if Faisal were installed in 'Iraq, the British Government would acquire increased control both over him and over his father, the Sharīf of Mecca, who was still proving intractable and exasperating in his relations with Great Britain. At a meeting of the Special

[1] His efforts to secure the release of the Syrians accused of treason during the war nearly cost him his own life. See Djemal Pasha, op. cit., pp. 217-18.

[2] Amīr Faisal, in his unpublished Memoirs, written during his sojourn in Italy in 1920, spoke, however, in glowing terms of his own Arab forces of the desert campaign, and declared that had they fought at Maisalun the French would not have won the engagement.

[3] In his *Memoirs*, Amīr Faisal maintained, not always correctly, that he had followed faithfully the advice of his British Advisers in all his relations with the French, relying on the help which they promised; that they had discouraged his summoning of his Hijāzī followers; and that in the crucial hour of his need, they had abandoned him to the French.

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Committee dealing with the question of a ruler for 'Iraq, on the opening day of the Conference, March 12th, Mr. Churchill declared that Faisal should be made to realize that his father's subsidy as well as the British guarantee to the Sharīf of non-aggression from Wahhābī sources depended on Faisal's own behaviour.

Although the approval of Amīr Faisal's candidature was almost a foregone certainty, the merits of the other candidates were not overlooked at the Conference. The High Commissioner, speaking on March 12th, did not believe that any local candidate could be elected. The Agha Khan, whose interests had become European rather than Asiatic, would not accept the nomination. Sentiment for a Turkish Prince was not strong enough to be considered. By the process of elimination as well as by his own merits, Faisal appeared to be the only possible candidate.

The difficulties attending the installation of Faisal in 'Iraq were not ignored. Warning notes were sounded as to the undoubted opposition of Saiyid Talib Pasha to any nominee other than himself[1] and as to the probable effect on Ibn Sa'ūd, an ally of Great Britain, of the establishment of the two new Hāshimī kingdoms: 'Iraq on the north and Transjordan on the north-west. To counter possible active hostility from Ibn Sa'ūd who had already shown interest in the political situation in 'Iraq, the Conference resolved that he should be acquainted with the attitude of H.M. Government to Faisal's candidature. The High Commissioner, accordingly, telegraphed to the Wahhābī leader shortly after the Conference had adjourned. He received in reply a letter, dated May 7th, 1921, expressing Ibn Sa'ūd's thanks for the consideration shown him at the Conference.[2] After Faisal's departure for 'Iraq and Mr. Churchill's

[1] Expected to take the form of anti-Mandate agitation.

[2] Kohn's statement, *History of Nationalism in the Near East*, p. 308, that the effect on Ibn Sa'ūd of the setting up of the Hāshimī princes was overlooked by the British Government, is not borne out by the records of the Cairo Conference. See *Parl. Debates*, H. of C., Vol. CXLIII (1921), pp. 265 ff. Also *supra*, p. 157.

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announcement, Ibn Sa'ūd again wrote, on June 21st, to the High Commissioner stating his willingness to accept the decision of the British Government, but asking that his own position be determined and safeguarded. Some time afterwards he replied in friendly terms to a message from Faisal.[1]

A further question arose at the Conference as to whether an 'Iraqī Congress or Assembly should propose Faisal as King. It was pointed out by a member of the special Committee that a concrete proposal must be placed before the Assembly if it were convened or the results of its deliberations would not be satisfactory. Mr. Churchill stated that he knew of no precedent for allowing a Constituent Assembly to choose its own ruler. It was eventually agreed that convocation of the Assembly before the installation of Faisal in 'Iraq was undesirable but that the High Commissioner should use his discretion according to the situation existing at the time. It was also agreed, in order that 'Iraq should appear to choose its own ruler, that a line of procedure should be followed which would give the 'Iraqis the opportunity of demanding Amīr Faisal. The following schedule was provisionally proposed:

April 18th — The High Commissioner would arrive in Baghdad.

April 18th to 21st — Announcement by the Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs that H.M. Government approved of Amīr Faisal as a candidate for the throne of 'Iraq. This would be accompanied by a proclamation of a general amnesty issued by the High Commissioner.

April 23rd — Amīr Faisal would send telegrams to Nūrī Pasha as-Sa'īd, to Talib Pasha and to the Naqīb of Baghdad

[1] Letter, Ibn Sa'ūd to Amīr Faisal, July 29th, 1921:

After compliments, etc., 'We thank God for your safety and beg that you will be always safe. May you prosper.

'There is no doubt that you are fit to be the foremost in good action as is proved by the capacity you have shown in solving difficulties and maintaining mutual support for the upkeep of the glory of the Arabs. You may be sure that your brother has no thought nor aspiration other than this.'

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announcing his candidature and saying that he, Faisal, hoped that he would have their co-operation.

April 23rd to May 8th — Nūrī Pasha and other 'Iraqīs would send telegrams to Amīr Faisal, inviting him to come to 'Iraq as its prospective King.

May 8th to June 8th — Amīr Faisal would come to 'Iraq or would send his representatives, the arrival to take place about the middle of May. He or his representatives would be met by such a welcome and response from 'Iraqīs as to make it unnecessary to convene the Constituent Assembly, except to ratify or to confirm his election as King.

This schedule, finally adopted after minor alterations as to details and dates, implied that the Amīr should come to agreement with H.M. Government in regard to the future treaty, to Great Britain's position in 'Iraq and towards the League of Nations and to his own position generally.[1] It also implied that the Sharifian party in Baghdad, stimulated by the announcement of approval by H.M. Government and by judicious promptings emanating from the British Residency, would prove to be sufficiently representative and powerful to merit the invitation to the Amīr to come to 'Iraq where he could appear only when the ground had been carefully ploughed and harrowed.

[1] *Progress of 'Iraq during the Period* 1920-1931 (Special Report by H.M. Government to Council of League of Nations, Colonial No. 58 (1931) (hereafter *Progress of 'Iraq*), p. 14).

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CHAPTER XVIII

THE ACCESSION OF FAISAL

To the High Commissioner, on his return from Cairo, fell the delicate task of ensuring that the choice of the 'Iraqis, when expressed, should fall upon the candidate approved at Cairo.

The undertaking was to prove no sinecure. During his absence, the various candidates and their partisans had increased the intensity of their campaigns, their intrigues and their agitations. The Hāshimī party had not been idle, the most recently returned group of 'Iraqī officers adding new recruits. The Shī'īs appeared to be increasingly in favour of a Hāshimī, although neither they nor the 'Iraqī officers had yet been able to come to a decision as to whether 'Abdullāh or Faisal was to be their nominee. Faisal had the greater reputation as a protagonist of Arab Nationalism, but many held that he was too pro-British. His frequent visits abroad also tended to show that he had become a foreigner. 'Abdullāh was regarded as more of a true Arab.[1]

The hostility of the pro-Turkish party had been somewhat decreased by the decisions of the London Conference in February and March.[2] Evidence was not lacking, however, that many of those who had been advocating a Turkish prince were now supporting the Naqīb, in order to prevent the election of a Hāshimī. 'Alī as-Sulaimān of the Dulaim had long been working for the Naqīb,[3] for whom, it was also reported, Ibn Sa'ūd was exercising his influence in order to oppose the Sharifians. The Shaikh of Mohammerah was still in the field

[1] *Al-Istiqlāl*, in a leading article, December 17th, 1920, maintained that 'Abdullāh's election at Damascus had been final and binding.
[2] *H.P.C.P.*, Vol. VI, pp. 32-3, 65-8, 89-96.
[3] See letter by 'Alī as-Sulaimān '*Al-Iraq*, April 19th, 1921.

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and did not withdraw his candidature or announce his support of Faisal until Faisal's departure for 'Iraq.[1]

The Naqīb himself had shown irreconcilable aversion to a son of the Sharīf. As early as February 6th, 1919, he had expressed himself in no uncertain terms, saying:

> I am a relative of the Sharif. I come of the same stock and I share the same religious opinions. You will therefore understand that I am not actuated by difference of blood or of thought when I tell you that I would never consent to the appointment of the Sharif or of his son as Amir. The Hijaz is one and 'Iraq is one, there is no connection but that of the faith . . . I would rather a thousand times have the Turks back in 'Iraq than see the Sharif or his sons installed here.[2]

He now desired a public announcement definitely excluding sons of the Sharīf. Failing that, he sought assurances that no ruler would be imposed on the people of 'Iraq contrary to their wishes. He professed himself, however, as satisfied with the High Commissioner's expressions of British official neutrality.

The candidature of Faisal, therefore, had to reckon on the combined opposition of the pro-Turks, the Naqīb, Ibn Sa'ūd and Saiyid Talib Pasha who, of them all, was held to be the most formidable. The High Commissioner realized that Saiyid Talib Pasha, in his strategic position as Minister of Interior and as one of the most powerful and influential men in 'Iraq, might wreck Faisal's chances in 'Iraq and thus upset all the carefully laid plans of H.M. Government. Saiyid Talib had been undoubtedly gaining ground in Baghdad, where his extraordinary influence over the public mind had been increased by a series of murders, wrongfully ascribed to his revenge against his enemies.[3] In the absence of the High Commissioner at the Cairo Conference, which was popularly believed to have been

[1] His letter was published in *Al-'Iraq*, June 14th, 1921.
[2] Bell, *Note on Political Views of the Naqīb*, p. 10.
[3] *Admin. Report, Baghdad Liwa*, 1921 (Baghdad, 1922), p. 2.

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convened to declare Faisal as King,[1] Saiyid Talib had toured the *Liwās* below Baghdad as far south as Rumaitha and Dīwānīya, spending several thousand pounds on propaganda in the name of the Naqīb, but in reality with an eye to his own interests.[2] More of a realist than the Naqīb and therefore more sceptical of the High Commissioner's assurances, he had also encouraged the widespread belief that whether 'Iraqīs wished for a son of the Sharīf or not, a Hāshimī would be set on the throne by Great Britain. Apprehension was felt in official circles lest his next move would be to stir up active opposition to the Mandate.

It had been planned by the High Commissioner that the Arab Ministers should be suspended and their functions carried on by the British Advisers during the critical period when Faisal's candidature was in abeyance.[3] The Ministers who favoured Faisal could thus work unimpeded by their official position, Talib Pasha would be removed from a position where he could use official pressure on his own behalf and British officials would be placed in the vital points of control.

The High Commissioner saw, however, that this plan would not be a sufficient check on Saiyid Talib. The opportunity for removing him completely from the scene was found in remarks made by Saiyid Talib at a dinner, given in his own house, April 14th, to which he had invited the French and Persian Consuls, Mr. Percival Landon, of the *Daily Telegraph* of London, other British guests, the Amīr ar-Rabī'a, Shaikh Salīm al-Khaiyūn and Saiyid Husain al-Afnan, Secretary of the Council of State, the whole gathering numbering thirteen. Following the dinner, Saiyid Talib addressed Mr. Landon in Arabic, his words being translated by a member of the party.

Saiyid Talib questioned Mr. Landon as to the measure of

[1] Bell, *Letters*, p. 590.
[2] *Admin. Report, Hilla Liwa*, 1921 (Baghdad, 1922), p. 3; *Daily Mail*, March 12th, 1921.
[3] Bell, op. cit., pp. 590-1. Nūrī Pasha, Nājī Pasha and other Sharifians had previously suggested the plan.

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175* 729* 643 confidence which could be placed in the undertaking of H.M. Government to ensure the freedom of the coming elections. He proceeded to point out that some of the British officers in the employment of the High Commissioner were exercising undue influence in favour of one of the candidates to the throne of 'Iraq. He inquired whether he should appeal to King George or to the High Commissioner for their removal.

Mr. Landon replied that there might also be officers who were known to be in favour of a local condidate, but that the removal of one group would involve that of another. On a whispered word of advice from the interpreter, Saiyid Talib pursued the subject no farther. He went on to say that should there be indications that the declared policy of the British Government was not being carried out, the Amīr ar-Rabī'a, with 20,000 rifles and Shaikh Salīm al-Khaiyūn, with all his tribesmen, were ready to see it done. He added that the Naqīb would not hesitate to lodge complaints in India, Cairo, Constantinople and Paris.[1]

On receiving what he believed to be a well-substantiated report of Saiyid Talib's speech, the High Commissioner asked the General Officer Commanding to arrange for Saiyid Talib's removal. On the same day he was arrested by British soldiers and, under military guard, was removed to Basra and from there deported to Ceylon.[2]

The High Commissioner felt his drastic action to be necessary. No man, particularly one so prominent, could be allowed to call in question the sincerity of the promises of the British Government or to threaten it with force. Even more imperative, however, was the risk that the continued presence of Saiyid

[1] See also *Communiqué*, April 18th, 1921; *Admin. Report*, 1920-1922, App. 6; also *Baghdad Times*, April 18th, 1921.

[2] *The Times* (London), April 23rd, 1921, published two versions of the incident; (*a*) from Tehran, dated April 20th, inaccurate and garbled; (*b*) from Allahabad, April 20th, based on the official *communiqué*. *Daily Telegraph*, April 23rd, also published the Allahabad version. Cf. statement, Coke, R.: *Heart of the Middle East*, p. 230, that owing to censorship, the incident 'was not reported in the London Press until many months had elapsed'.

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Talib might nullify the decision reached at Cairo: the final effort of H.M. Government to settle the future status of 'Iraq.

The action of the High Commissioner convinced the great mass of the 'Iraqis that the British authorities would not hesitate to use strong measures if the occasion demanded it. This widespread conviction probably did more to ensure the acquiescence of the masses of the population in Faisal's candidature, once it was announced, than the absence of Talib Pasha's opposition or the existence of any definite desire among them for a son of the Sharif of Mecca. In any case Faisal's prospects of success immediately improved. The Naqib withdrew his opposition to a Hāshimī, declaring that it would be best to follow the wishes of H.M. Government. A moderate Sharifian party having a definite programme was formed, with the approval of the High Commissioner who, while aware of the immense influence which the Sharifians could exert in creating and enlarging public opinion for Faisal, also realized the necessity of controlling them and of preventing the extremists from using Faisal for their own ends in opposition to the Mandate. Encouragement to the Sharifians was also extended by the vernacular press, particularly by *Ash-Sharq*, under the editorship of the Secretary to the Council of State;[1] by *Al-'Iraq* which took the most prominent part;[2] by *Lisān al-'Arab* which, under its editor, Ibrāhīm Hilmī al-'Umarī, was pro-Faisal and, for the moment, pro-British;[3] and by *Al-Auqāt al-'Irāqīya* of Basra and *Al-Mūsil* of Mōsul.[4] The *Baghdad Times*, the English newspaper owned by the Government, also published a few pro-Faisal articles.

In the creation of sentiment on behalf of Amīr Faisal and in

[1] Established August 30th, 1920, by Saiyid Husain al-Afnan.

[2] See particularly its issues of April 25th, 26th, 28th, 29th; May 4th, 7th, 9th to 13th, 21st, 23rd; June 4th, 13th, 14th.

[3] Originally published in Damascus, its editor had transferred it to Baghdad, its first number, 401, appearing on June 23rd, 1921. It had not always given its support to Faisal as King of 'Iraq. Cf. issue of November 13th, 1920.

[4] Founded in 1921 and on November 14th, 1918, respectively. Both were owned by the Government.

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the encouragement of his partisans, the High Commissioner, although obliged to maintain an outwardly neutral attitude, could not in so important a question refrain from taking a hand behind the scenes. The eventual success of Faisal's candidature must be attributed in no small degree to his guiding direction. 'He is a master hand at the game of politics,' wrote Miss Bell on June 12th, 1921, 'it's an education to watch him playing it.'[1]

Members of his staff and the British Advisers throughout the country, although nominally neutral, were not so restricted in practice, as Saiyid Talib had pointed out on April 14th. It devolved particularly on Miss Bell, as an enthusiastic supporter of Amīr Faisal, rather than as Oriental Secretary, although the prestige of her position and the knowledge acquired through it contributed greatly to her effectiveness, to take the leading personal role in developing and organizing public opinion for Faisal.[2]

The early statement by H.M. Government of its approval of the candidature of Amīr Faisal, followed by Faisal's own announcement that he intended to present himself as a candidate, the declaration of a general amnesty and the efforts of the Amīr's supporters in 'Iraq had been expected, in accordance with the schedule approved of at Cairo, to start the ball rolling in his direction.

Neither the announcements nor the amnesty were immediately forthcoming, however, although they had been foreshadowed in the High Commissioner's *communiqué* of April 12th,[3] following his return from Cairo. H.M. Government had felt it inexpedient to make its announcement until it had secured the formal approval of the League of Nations for the Mandate. This was being delayed in deference to the inquiries of the United States Government as to Great Britain's intentions

[1] Bell, op. cit., p. 598; also pp. 599, 602, 606-8.

[2] Miss Bell's letters during this period, ibid., pp. 582-624, partially indicate the decisive role she played in the installation of Faisal. According to Amīn Rihānī, *Ibn Sa'oud*, p. 8, she later seemed to regret the role she had played.

[3] *Baghdad Times*, April 12th, 1921; *Admin. Report*, 1920-1922, App. 4.

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regarding the 'Open Door' in 'Iraq, where, the former maintained, citing the San Remo Agreement as evidence, that Great Britain had assumed a position inconsistent with the draft Mandate which was specific on the point of economic equality.[1] The amnesty did not appear until May 30th,[2] due to prolonged consultations with the Quai d'Orsay and the Government of India.

Without the announcements, the situation in 'Iraq hung fire in spite of the strenuous efforts made by Faisal's partisans in the expectation that the Cairo schedule would be followed. It was clear that many of the 'Iraqis were holding back for a definite lead. The answers of Sharif Husain to the telegrams sent him by 'Iraqi notables, asking that he send one of his sons to 'Iraq, were too vague to give the desired stimulus, although they were regarded by many as having been inspired by H.M. Government — it was generally known that he had drawn a subsidy from the British Government.[3] In Mōsul, where strong sentiment existed in favour of Amir Faisal, the efforts of the Baghdad Sharifian party to secure co-operation in sending letters to Sharif Husain were deemed an attempt to force the issue, which should be left to the Constituent Assembly.

Not until early June did the official machinery begin to move, and then according to a modified form of the original Cairo schedule. In the first week of June, H.M. Government telegraphed permission to the Hijāz that Faisal might leave for 'Iraq. Accordingly telegrams from the Sharif, announcing that he was sending his son Faisal to the Arabs of 'Iraq, were

[1] Article 11 of the Draft Mandate for Mesopotamia, *Accts. and Papers*, 1921 (Cmd. 1176), xliii, 721. For this controversy, which aroused much ill feeling on both sides, see ibid., 1921 (Cmd. 1226) xliii, 481; 1921 (Cmd. 1351), xliii, 493. Also Gerig, B., *The Open Door and the Mandate System* (1930), Ch. vi; Secretary Hughes, *New York Times*, October 24th, 1924.

[2] Text: *Baghdad Times* and *Basrah Times*, May 30th, 1921; *Admin. Report*, 1920-1922, App. 5.

[3] His subsidy had ceased in February, 1920. It was renewed subsequent to Faisal's enthronement, but only a single payment of £5000 was made in August, 1921, as the Sharif failed to live up to the conditions imposed: *Parl. Debates*, H. of L., Vol. XLIX (1922), pp. 241-3.

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dispatched to 'Iraqī notables.[1] Accompanied by three A.D.C.s, his private secretary, Colonel Cornwallis (his personal Adviser) and a party of 'Iraqī notables,[2] Amīr Faisal left Jidda on June 12th, on R.I.M.S. *Northbrook*.[3]

The Election of Faisal

The Amīr arrived at Basra on June 23rd. Three weeks later, the Council of State unanimously declared him King of 'Iraq.

In spite of the delays, the stage was well set for his reception. Mr. Churchill's long awaited statement in the House of Commons, June 14th,[4] was published in 'Iraq, June 17th.[5] The Naqīb and the Turkish party were disappointed at its pro-Sharifian tone. They held that Mr. Churchill's statement that:

> They [H.M. Government] wish to make it clear, however, as they have repeatedly stated, that there is no intention or desire whatever of forcing a particular ruler on the people. On the contrary, it is desired that there will be complete freedom of choice and expression of opinion,

hardly harmonized with his declaration:

> H.M. Government consider the Amīr Faisal a suitable candidate, indeed, the most suitable candidate in the field, and hope that he will secure the support of the majority of the people of 'Iraq.

[1] *Al-'Iraq*, June 13th and 21st, 1921. Sharīf Husain's telegram to the Naqīb is as follows:

'Having regard to the needs of the nation and the desire of the inhabitants, my son Faisal has left for your region. Owing to our relationship, I must say to you that it behoves us all to unite so as to give rest to the land, fulfilling its hopes and safeguarding its future. All this will come to pass through your good intentions and your religious and national sentiments. May God prosper you. – Husain.'

[2] These included a number of Nationalist leaders responsible for the Insurrection, as Yūsuf as-Sūwaidī, Saiyid Muhammad as-Sadr, Saiyid Nūr, Saiyid Hādī Mūqutar, 'Alī Bazirqān, and 'Alī Jaudāt Beg. See *Al-'Iraq*, June 27th, 1921.

[3] *Baghdad Times*, June 18th, 1921.

[4] *Parl. Debates*, H. of C, 5th S., Vol. CXLIII (1921), pp. 265 ff.

[5] *Al-'Iraq*. June 17th, 1921. The version as published in the official *communiqué*, which is cited above, differs somewhat from that appearing in *Parliamentary Debates* (q.v.). See also *Baghdad Times*, June 17th, 1921, and *Basrah Times*, June 19th, 1921.

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Nor did his first statement agree with the intimation that no other candidate would be considered, since H.M. Government regarded a republic as unsuitable for 'Iraq and they would not 'tolerate the alternative of a Turkish Prince'.

The Sharifian party, on the other hand, was delighted and the public as a whole, it was believed, was glad to have a definite lead from the British Government.[1]

The Naqīb's attitude to the Amīr, however, was above reproach.[2] He led the Council in giving a national aspect to the Amīr's reception. Five Council members were appointed, on June 16th,[3] to arrange for ceremonies and for lodging befitting the distinguished visitor: the former King of Syria and the son of a King. A mass meeting of some five hundred people, on June 17th, held under the auspices of Nājī Pasha and the *Mutasarrif* of Baghdad, at the suggestion of Miss Bell and with the approval of the High Commissioner, arranged for Baghdad's share in the Amīr's reception. It also selected sixty notables to go to Basra to welcome Faisal on his arrival there. In addition, the Mayor of Baghdad sent telegrams to the principal towns, suggesting that they send delegations to greet Faisal.

Amīr Faisal arrived at Baghdad, June 29th, somewhat shaken by the manner of his reception in the south. He and his entourage had been led to believe, before arriving at Basra, that the country was solidly supporting him. His reception at Basra by the notables of that city[4] and of Baghdad, headed by Ja'far

[1] *Al-'Iraq*, June 17th, 1921, and *Lisān al-'Arab*, June 24th, 1921. The latter wrote: 'The Arabs welcome it with great pleasure.'

[2] The Naqīb telegraphed the following welcome to Faisal:

'To the light of the Candle of the family of the Prophet, the Pearly Star in the heaven of honour, H. H. the Amīr Faisal.

'I have received with respect Your Highness' telegram which proves your Hāshimī sentiments towards me and gives me the happy news of your arrival. Our hearts have been filled with pleasure. We thank you for your speedy and safe arrival. The ministers and the nation welcome you.' (*Al-'Iraq*, June 24th, 1921).

[3] June 11th as recorded in *Political Developments in Mtso.*, p. 5, is obviously erroneous.

[4] Three days before Faisal's arrival, the High Commissioner had been forced to discourage severely a petition from Basra bearing about 4500 signatures, asking that Basra be given a separate legislature and full independence in financial, military and police affairs, under the king chosen by 'Iraq.

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Pasha, Mr. Philby, representing the High Commissioner, Major W. C. F. Wilson, Adviser of the Basra *Liwā* and Colonel J. H. F. Lakin, representing the General Officer Commanding, had been excellent.[1] His reception elsewhere had been decidely disappointing. At Ur Junction, the gathering from Nāsiriya had been small and cold. At Samāwa, a large number of shaikhs and tribesmen had turned out and at Dīwānīya, the audience had been fair, but there had been little enthusiasm. At Karbalā, the Indian *Qaimmaqām*, who had little faith in Arab self-government, had left the town the day before Faisal's arrival, without indicating the official attitude towards the Amīr. After an interview with the High Commissioner, however, he had returned to Karbalā and attempted to make suitable preparations, but there had been no spontaneity and the *'Ulamā* stood markedly aloof. At Najaf, the *'Ulamā* had been reserved, if not hostile. At Tuwairijī and at Hilla, however, Faisal had been more cordially received.[2]

At the capital, however, where he was greeted on his arrival by the High Commissioner, his staff and a huge crowd of 'Iraqī notables, the enthusiasm of his welcome was reassuring. The dense and cheering crowds which filled the capital, bedecked with the Sharifian colours, green, red, and black, gave additional proof that the city accepted him.[3] The ovation given him the next day at Kādhimain, where he prayed in the mosque according to the Shī'a rite, was as remarkable as that of Baghdad.

The enthusiasm of these receptions, regarding which his

[1] *Basrah Times*, June 24th, 25th; *Al-'Iraq* and *Baghdad Times*, June 27th, 1921. The Baghdad and Basra Committees were not present when Faisal arrived. They had gone down stream to meet the *Northbrook*, but they failed to recognize it until too late.

[2] The lack of enthusiasm and of adequate preparations in the Lower and Middle Euphrates areas was probably not unrelated to the predilection of the Adviser to the Ministry of Interior, who was in charge of making arrangements, for a republic and with his subsequent relinquishment of office in early July. *Communiqué, Al-'Iraq*, July 7th, 1921; also Cox, Sir P. Z.: 'Historical Summary' in Bell, op. cit., p. 528.

[3] *Baghdad Times*, June 30th, 1921.

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supporters had been genuinely concerned, tended to simplify the situation, but anxious moments were by no means over. The failure of the inhabitants of the lower Euphrates to come forward as expected and the aloofness of the Shī'a divines were disconcerting. It was believed that the Muntafiq tribes were preparing a great manifesto in favour of a republic. Rumours of the formal disapproval of the *Mujtahids* were in the air. The pro-Turks were coldly hostile; the supporters of Saiyid Talib Pasha were sullen; and many people outside the cities were still indifferent. Against these unfavourable manifestations, however, could be set the stream of delegates from the towns of northern 'Iraq, the approbation of Basra and Baghdad, the prospect of approval from Mōsul which had sent a strong and substantial delegation and the gradual winning over of the shaikhs and notables, including the Naqīb's strongest supporter, 'Alī as-Sulaimān, through the efforts of Sir Percy Cox, Miss Bell and Faisal himself. Of the latter Miss Bell wrote, on July 7th, 1922: 'What helps everything is that Faisal's personality goes three quarters of the way. He has been roping in adherents.'[1] His simple dignity, great personal charm and his eloquent speeches, heartwarming and full of wisdom, continued to win the confidence and support of the communities before which he appeared: Christians,[2] Jews,[3] Sunnīs,[4] and Shī'īs,[5] although his reception at Najaf and Karbalā had been markedly restrained.

Anxiety for the success of his candidature had not diminished the apprehension lest the more ardent Nationalists should

[1] Bell, op. cit., p. 608.

[2] As at a reception given by the Catholic Christian Community, Baghdad, July 30th, 1921. For excerpts from his speech see Appendix VII (v).

[3] For excerpts of speech made at the House of the Grand Rabbi see Appendix VII (iii).

[4] For speech to the Mōsul delegation see Appendix VII (i); also various speeches, as at the Ja'farīya School, July 9th; *Al-Dijla*, July 11th, 1921. The outburst demanding complete independence at the latter meeting was toned down in *Al-Dijla*.

[5] As at Kādhimain, June 30th, and at the Husainīya School, July 4th, 1921. See *Al-Dijla*, July 10th, 1921.

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attempt to turn the popular enthusiasm into a *coup d'état*. Outbursts coupling complete independence and an immediate declaration of allegiance to Faisal as King of 'Iraq had already occurred, as at meetings held in Faisal's honour on July 4th and 9th.[1] Suggestions that Faisal might be immediately acclaimed King had also come to the ears of the High Commissioner.[2] Neither he nor Faisal wished it to be said in the future that Faisal owed his throne, not to the will of the people, constitutionally expressed, but rather to a *coup d'état* initiated by the Nationalists who, in return, would expect to influence policy in the direction of complete independence and to share in the administration of the kingdom. The Residency, moreover, had borne the brunt of the battle and it must enjoy the fruits of the victory. Faisal, on his side, had little wish to be placed so soon under obligations to any group, which, if its expectations were not fulfilled, would be the first to turn against him.

The agreement reached at the Cairo Conference that the country should be made, if possible, to declare itself without the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, found support with large groups of Faisal's more moderate adherents. It was now echoed, apparently without inspiration from the Residency, in the vernacular press which dropped its original insistence on the immediate convocation of the National Assembly in order to press for a referendum.[3] Faisal himself joined in the insistence for prompt action.

The High Commissioner, feeling that the propitious moment had arrived, took immediate steps. In reply to a letter, July 8th, from the Council of State, inquiring, at his suggestion,[4]

[1] *Al-Dijla*, July 10th and 11th, 1921.

[2] Bell, op. cit., pp. 601, 602; also *Al-Dijla*, July 2nd, 1921. The Mayor of Mu'adhdham, on July 12th, called together the leading citizens and shaikhs, who declared Faisal to be their King, *Al-'Iraq*, July 13th, 1921.

[3] *Lisān al-'Arab*, on July 2nd and 5th, urged the convocation of the Assembly, but on July 6th, recommended a referendum, also on July 8th, 9th and 13th. *Al-'Iraq* insisted on a referendum on July 8th, 9th and 11th; also *Al-Fallāh*, July 10th, 1921.

[4] Bell, op. cit., pp. 607-8.

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as to the immediate cause of the delay in promulgating the Election Law and as to whether he had any objection to its immediate publication,[1] he stated that the delay had been due to the difficulty 'in finding a formula which would cover the cases of several Kurdish Communities in 'Iraq'. In view of 'the cogent reasons' now before the Council, he was ready to promulgate the Law if suitable arrangements could be made for the Kurds. He feared, however, that the time required for convening the Assembly would be not less than three months. He then pointed out:

> There appears to be an increasingly insistent demand on the part of the public for an immediate opportunity to decide who shall be ruler.
>
> To obtain this early decision less centralized machinery will have to be devised and the High Commissioner, in so far as it rests with him, will be glad to facilitate any appropriate special measures which the Council may recommend for the purpose.[2]

Without further suggestion from the High Commissioner, the Council of Ministers, on the proposal of the President, the Naqīb, on July 11th passed a unanimous resolution declaring:

> H.H. Amīr Faisal King of 'Iraq, provided that His Highness's Government shall be constitutional, representative and democratic and limited by law.[3]

The Council passed a further unanimous resolution to communicate its decision to the Minister of Interior in order that it might take necessary action.

Both the High Commissioner and Faisal were delighted with the Council's action, but they agreed that it was still necessary

[1] Letter No. 131/S, Secretary, Council of Ministers, to Secretary to the High Commissioner, July 8th, 1921.

[2] Letter SD/1631, Secretary to the High Commissioner to Secretary, Council of State, July 8th, 1921.

[3] Extract from Minutes of Council of Ministers, July 11th, 1921: *Al-'Iraq* and *Lisān al-'Arab*, July 15th, 1921.

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175 727 643 to hold a referendum in order to prove to the world that Amīr Faisal really had the voice of the people. Using his prerogative of confirming resolutions of the Council,[1] the High Commissioner announced that the resolution of July 11th must be supported by the assent of the people, ascertained by a referendum, before he would grant his approval.

In initiating the referendum, every effort was taken to ensure the desired results. Opinion on the resolution was expressed in most *Liwās* by the *Mutasarrif* and the British Advisers. In other *Liwās*, as Karbalā, the meetings were summoned by the British Adviser or by trusted Government officials. In Basra *Liwā*, selected representatives of the population were called in groups to make their declarations in the presence of an Election Committee. Official *madhbatas* were printed, any deviation from which by the addition of Nationalist proposals, was punished,[2] while riders declaring for further British support were not only permitted but encouraged.[3] In addition, the manner of registering the decisions, whereby the vote of the majority of a town or district was counted as its unanimous vote and the 'politics running on wheels greased with extremely well-melted grease'[4] tended to produce the desired decision.

Nevertheless, the Government did not have its own way entirely. The official *madhbata* did not meet the approval of the Shī'īs. Shaikh Mahdī al-Khālisī, a Shī'a *'Alim* of high standing drew up a formula strongly insisting on freedom from external control[5] and a party was formed to stir up agitation on its behalf. On July 28th, at a mass meeting in Baghdad, ostensibly summoned to sign the official *madhbata*, a modified declaration

[1] Instructions for Council of State, Sec. 10.
[2] The *Mutasarrif* of Baghdad was forced to resign for permitting the additions to the *madhbatas*.
[3] The High Commissioner telegraphed permission for the addition of riders asking for continued British control. The Advisers, as at Diwānīya, used this permission to obtain such declarations.
[4] Bell, op. cit., p. 611.
[5] Cited in *Al-'Iraq*, July 16th, 1921.

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was presented and approved without a dissenting vote.[1] The altered form was presented to the voters of Baghdad, July 29th, with the result that sixty-six of the eighty declarations of Baghdad made the acceptance of Faisal conditional on two points: that 'Iraq should be independent of foreign sovereignty and that the Constituent Assembly should be convened in three months. Kirkūk *Liwā*, still hesitating between joining 'Iraq or the Kurdish enclaves, voted against Faisal. Sulaimānīya took no part in the referendum. In Mōsul, many of the declarations accepted Faisal on the condition that the rights of the Kurds and the minorities should be protected.

Elsewhere, the referendum proceeded quietly. Both at Karbalā and at Najaf, through the skill and assiduity of the *Mutasarrif*, the official formula was signed without additions. In Hilla, many of the forty-one declarations contained a rider, added by permission telegraphed by the High Commissioner, that Faisal was accepted on condition that the British Mandate would continue. Sixteen of the twenty-six Dulaim declarations, five of the seven 'Amāra statements and a number of those from Mōsul added similar provisos. In the Shāmīya country, as at Dīwānīya, voters made a similar condition after the Adviser had informed them that they might add any words they liked. So certain was the result of the referendum that, before it was half completed and a month before his formal accession, Amīr Faisal, at Ramādī, August 25th, received the oath of allegiance as King of 'Iraq from the shaikhs and tribesmen of the Dulaim and the 'Anaiza and from the towns of the Upper Euphrates from Ramādī to Al-Qaim.[2] On August 15th the Naqīb was asked to undertake the formation of the first Cabinet for the new kingdom.[3]

The referendum, as it was carried out, was hardly a gauge

[1] The altered declaration is given in *Lisān al-'Arab*, July 27th, 1921.

[2] *Al-Dījla*, August 1st; *Baghdad Times*, August 5th, 1921 (Fahād Beg's pro-British outburst was omitted); Bell, op. cit., pp. 613-15. For excerpts from Faisal's speech to the Shaikhs, see Appendix VII.

[3] Bell, op. cit., p. 618.

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of spontaneous popular support for Amīr Faisal, as official Reports would suggest,[1] nor was it entirely the 'hasty pretence' assumed by some popular writers.[2] It undoubtedly reflected the views of 'Iraq's leading inhabitants at the time, as had the plebiscite of 1918-19, which it resembled in a number of aspects. Its result, as published, however, did not constitute a true cross-section of 'Iraqi opinion, as might have been obtained at a general election or in a Constituent Assembly. It is quite probable that the anxiety of the High Commissioner and of Faisal for an immediate declaration, backed by a referendum, was not due only to the fear of a *coup d'état* or to the necessity of vindicating the assurances of H.M. Government. It may have been based on the knowledge that any election would increase the chances against Faisal, although the majority of the country's natural leaders, the shaikhs, the landlords and the notables, would probably have voted then for Faisal as they did in the referendum, either from a genuine regard for him or from the more likely desire to follow the lead of the Government, a factor on which the High Commissioner and his staff had steadfastly counted. In view of the altered tone of the country in the next few months, subsequent to the revelation that the proposed treaty did not mean abrogation of the Mandate, a fact hitherto suppressed, it seems possible that had the decision been left to an Assembly elected by the country, no verdict for Faisal as favourable as a 96 per cent majority vote of the population could have been announced.[3]

Not all the difficulties which faced the Residency in these crucial days had their origin in the state of public opinion in 'Iraq. The Colonial Office, in the middle of August, sent a

[1] *Admin. Report*, 1920-1922, p. 9; *Progress of 'Iraq*, p. 14.

[2] Kohn, Hans: *Nationalism and Imperialism*, p. 212; *History of Nationalism in the East*, p. 309; Coke, R.: *The Arab's place in the Sun*, p. 245.

[3] It is difficult to understand how this figure was obtained. The population of Kirkūk, whether taken on the basis of the 1918-19 census or on that of 1930, forms approximately 6 per cent of the population of 'Iraq, exclusive of Sulaimāniya.

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cable to the High Commissioner stating that Faisal in his coronation speech must declare that the ultimate authority in 'Iraq lay with the High Commissioner.

Faisal immediately protested that he could not go on if such a statement were required. He pointed out that in the conversations held in London, he had accepted the candidature for the throne on the understanding that a treaty of alliance to replace the Mandate would be negotiated and that his prestige and dignity as king would be safeguarded. It was essential that he appear as an independent sovereign in alliance with Great Britain if he were to win over the extreme Nationalists. The High Commissioner also pointed out to the Colonial Office the unfavourable effect which the announcement would have on the country as well as on Faisal. He submitted that sufficient control could be exercised by less obvious methods. The order was eventually modified, a few days before the enthronement on August 23rd, the day selected by Faisal.[1]

Long before the hour set for the ceremony of accession, six o'clock of the morning of August 23rd, all available space in the great *Sarai* Square was filled with tribal shaikhs, religious dignitaries, civil and military officials and notables from all parts of 'Iraq, save Kirkūk and Sulaimānīya. The *Sarai* itself had been decorated with multitudes of 'Iraqī flags of black, white, green and red, and with banners bearing loyal inscriptions. Smart recruits of the National Army were drawn up around the Square. The 1st Royal Berkshires furnished the guard of honour.[2]

Promptly at six o'clock, Amīr Faisal made his appearance, accompanied by Sir Percy Cox, Lieut.-General Sir Aylmer Haldane, Colonel Cornwallis and A.D.C.s and proceeded across the Square to the raised dais. After Amīr Faisal's salutations to

[1] This day was chosen by Faisal because it coincided with the Shī'a feast of Al-Ghadīr, commemorating the nomination of 'Alī as master of the people by the Prophet Muhammad.

[2] *Baghdad Times*, August 24th, 1921; but cf. Bell, op. cit., pp. 620-1, where the Dorsets are mentioned.

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the assembly, the party was seated, Sir Percy Cox on the right and Sir Aylmer Haldane on the left of the Amir.

Saiyid Husain al-Afnan, Secretary to the Council of Ministers, read the High Commissioner's proclamation which stated that, in accordance with the referendum on the resolution of the Council of State of July 11th, the Amīr Faisal had been elected King of 'Iraq by 96 per cent of the people. He then cried 'Long live the King'. The 'Iraq standard was broken out, the military band played 'God Save the King' — there was no Arab National Anthem — and a royal salute of twenty-one guns was fired.

After a short oration by Saiyid Mahmūd, eldest son of the Naqīb, Faisal spoke with great dignity. He thanked the 'Iraq nation for its generous and freely given allegiance and the British nation for its support of Arab independence, in which cause he called to mind the services of his father and of the Arabs associated with him. He also thanked

> the provisional Government for its zealous services and His Excellency the High Commissioner for his sincere friendship and the Great British Government for its reception of me as King of the Independent State of 'Iraq, to which high office I am called by the direct will of the Nation.

He outlined the aims of the nation, to achieve which, unity among all classes and the assistance of the friendly British nation would be necessary. He then made known his policy as head of the kingdom:

> I will spare no effort to profit by the qualities of every man of the nation, irrespective of religion or class. All to me shall be equal. There shall be no distinction between townsman and Bedui; for me the sole distinction shall be that of knowledge and capacity. The whole nation is my party and I have no other. The interests of the country as a whole are my interest and I have no other.
>
> My first task will be to proceed with the elections and the convocation of the Constituent Assembly. The nation should

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understand that it is this congress that will in consultation with me draw up the Constitution of its independence on the basis of democratic government and define the fundamental principles of political and social life. Finally it will confirm the Treaty which I shall lay before it, regarding the relations which are to exist between our Government and the Great British Government. Furthermore, the Congress will establish the freedom of religion and worship so that all men may follow their own law and religion provided it does not conflict with security and public morals.

It will also enact certain Judicial Laws which will safeguard the interests of foreigners and insure them against any interference with their religion, race or language and will guarantee equity of commercial dealings with the foreign countries. In this connection I am confident that in consultation with Sir Percy Cox who has proved his friendship to the Arabs in a manner which will ever live in their affectionate memory, we shall, please God, reach our goal.

I appeal to you for union and co-operation, deep deliberation and insight. You must seek knowledge and must work. For the rest, it is for God to help us and grant us success.[1]

[1] *Baghdad Times*, August 24th, 1921.

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175* and the civic spirit in which the political institutions and the departments of State have evolved from 1925 to 1932. The Permanent Mandates Commission itself had been inclined to consider that these considerations were in reality far more indicative of 'Iraq's fitness for emancipation than the mere possession of the machinery of a modern State.[1]

The Crown

643 On the promulgation of the Constitution, King Faisal, in accordance with his declaration to the High Commissioner, September 10th,[2] privately announced his withdrawal from direct participation in the affairs of State. Although this self-denying ordinance was received with some scepticism in ministerial circles, the King did refrain for a period of time from his former active intervention in administrative affairs. As time passed, however, and acting on the advice of the British authorities, including that given by the Secretary of State for the Colonies,[3] King Faisal not only resumed his place as the actual executive of the State but even exceeded the powers explicitly assigned him by the Constitution. His natural tendency was not uninfluenced by the fact that, as the point of balance between Great Britain and his own people, he had every encouragement to concentrate power within himself. To him the High Commissioner looked for the assurance that the Treaty would be observed. Through him British control was to be exercised over the Council of Ministers, over Parliament and the conduct of administration. The necessity of strengthening the King's hands to enable the High Commissioner to achieve these ends had been recognized from the first by the British drafters of the Constitution.[4] Wide powers had been assured to the King by the provisions in the Constitution, in spite of the

[1] *Official Journal*, League of Nations, November, 1931, pp. 2056 ff.
[2] *Supra*, p. 361.
[3] Dobbs, H. R. C., in Bell, *Letters*, p. 554.
[4] *Supra*, Ch. xix.

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insistence of the 'Iraqī ministers that the original proposals be altered. In addition, in the practical application of the powers so assured him, it seems clear that the responsible British officials in 'Iraq, in their privileged position as guardians of the Constitution, not only acquiesced in but also encouraged the King to exercise his personal influence and prerogative beyond a strict interpretation of the Constitution in order that their own control might be made more complete. No clearer example of such action exists than the resignation of Nājī Pasha as-Sūwaidī in March, 1930, at the instigation of the Residency, due to the fact that his policy aimed at achieving 'complete independence' before 1932.

On the other hand, King Faisal himself, under the sustained stimulus of his own desire and that of the Nationalists for complete independence, made every effort to concentrate as much personal power as possible in his own hands. It need not be imputed that he sought power for its own sake. He desired it both because it would enable him to meet the responsibilities and obligations thrust upon him by the Treaties and also because it would place him in a stronger position to win concessions from Great Britain, thus bringing 'Iraq nearer to the goal of independence. By the concentration of power in his own hands he believed that he could command the support of the various sections and groups in 'Iraq which, by their quarrels and animosities, would otherwise mar 'Iraq's prospects for national development and ultimate independence. He was only too well aware of the slight foundation of public support on which his early authority had rested. It seems to have been his plan to identify himself with the nation's needs as far as his British Advisers would permit; to be sovereign in fact as well as in name; and to lead the country to prosperity and to independent Statehood. In the fulfilment of these objectives there can be no doubt that King Faisal made many mistakes, particularly in placing his confidence in Nationalist groups whose ambitions for 'Iraq were possibly less impersonal than

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643 his own. Nevertheless, it is also true that had he not so identified himself with their programmes, he would not have won the esteem and regard of his subjects so markedly shown on his death.

643 645 In no field was King Faisal's assumption of power more evident than in the circumstances attending the formation and the fall of the Ministries. In spite of Article 66 of the Constitution which, contrary to the wishes of the King at the time of drafting, had made the Ministers collectively and individually responsible to the Chamber,[1] not one of the fifteen Ministries during his reign, 1921-33, owed its downfall to a direct vote of no confidence by the Chamber.[2] In almost every instance, the resignation of the Cabinet was due either to the direct wish of the King or to the belief that it no longer possessed His Majesty's confidence. Thus, in early April, 1922, the reorganization of the Naqīb's Cabinet was occasioned by the King's dislike of four Ministers and his determination to remove them from office. The fall of the Naqīb's second Cabinet, August 14th, 1922, was due to resentment on the part of the Ministers at the King's interference and his obvious desire for its resignation.[3] The retirement from office of 'Abdul Muhsin Beg as-Sa'dūn, November 16th, 1923, was in large measure the result of His Majesty's objection to the strong line adopted by the Council, particularly aginst the *'Ulamā* in June of that year.[4] The King's desire for a more aggressive Cabinet was known to be directly responsible for the resignation of Taufīq Beg as-Sūwaidī, August 25th, 1929.[5] Nūrī Pasha's resignation, October 24th, 1932, although attributed to a number of causes, was in reality due to the King's wish for a change of Ministers, if not to more personal reasons.

[1] It may be argued with reason that this article did not make the ministers exclusively responsible to the Chamber.

[2] 'Abdul Muhsin Beg resigned, however, November 1st, 1926, when the Chamber elected its President from the Opposition, as the result of a temporary defection of the Kurdish section of the *Taqāddam* or Government Party. Yāsīn Pasha has given as the reason for his resignation, June 26th, 1925, that he felt he could not command the confidence of Parliament.

[3] *Supra*, p. 357 [4] Ibid., pp. 392-3. [5] Ibid., p. 412

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PROGRESS OR RETROGRESSION?

Every Prime Minister in forming a Cabinet was faced with the necessity of choosing Ministers compliant not only with the High Commissioner's requirement that they 'deal sensibly with relations between Great Britain and 'Iraq' but also with His Majesty's personal wishes, likes and dislikes. It was generally recognized that Ja'far Pasha's first Cabinet, November 3rd, 1923, was composed of members in sympathy with the King's ideas and pledged to pass the Treaty of 1922. In January, 1928, 'Abdul Muhsin Beg, who had been suggested by the High Commissioner as the only available Minister capable of bringing about the ratification of the Treaty of 1927, formed his Cabinet with great difficulty owing to the King's secret opposition to a strong Ministry for reasons connected with the Treaty.

In the Parliamentary elections, the King, not uninfluenced by lessons learned from the intractability of the Constituent Assembly, likewise exerted his influence. He insisted in some cases, as in the elections of 1925, on the addition to the list of official candidates the names of men he particularly desired to see in the Chamber, and on the deletion of others which were not acceptable to him personally.

In the second elections, during the spring of 1928, his interference took a curious form. 'Abdul Muhsin Beg had come to office, pledged to secure ratification of the Treaty of 1927, on the condition that the Chamber be dissolved, a step approved by the High Commissioner, as the Opposition in the Chamber had been steadily growing. The Prime Minister's suggestion that the usual confidential letters be sent to the *Mutasarrifs* to ensure the return of deputies favourable to the Treaty, was opposed by the King. By permitting free elections, His Majesty hoped to bring an anti-Treaty Chamber into opposition with the Cabinet to prove to H.B.M. Government that, contrary to the High Commissioner's contention in late 1927,[1] the Treaty and the new Agreements were unacceptable to the people of 'Iraq.

In the parliamentary elections of 1930, the King, seeking a

[1] *Supra*, pp. 410-411.

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643 new Chamber which would not only ratify the new Treaty of
666 1930 without raising difficulties, but which would also contain Cabinet material on which he could ring Ministerial changes as he thought necessary, made his personal approval obligatory before candidates received government support.

643 In the conduct of general administration, however, the intervention of the King was as a rule well directed and in the
[655] interests of the country as a whole. To him has been ascribed the initiation of the Capital Development Works scheme,[1] whereby revenue from oil-concessions was earmarked for definite projects to facilitate the development of the country.[2]
[166] To him has been given the credit for the plans to settle the tribes on the land, and the development of residential amenities about Baghdad. In administrative appointments, his early inclination to find employment for those who had served him in western Arabia was never entirely overcome, but in general, as a result of his influence, more suitable appointments were made and without regard for religious distinctions. His broad outlook and his consideration for each community in proportion to its contribution to the welfare of 'Iraq enabled him to take a wider view of affairs than many of his Ministers and the majority of his subjects. It is a fact that although 'Iraqis universally proclaimed their familiarity with democratic institutions from the time of the Ottoman regime, and boldly asserted their competence to run them, conditions in 'Iraq were
[565] far from ideal for the introduction of such institutions. No adequate class existed from which responsible and public-spirited officials could be drawn, nor was there a substantial body of literate and informed citizens with which to work the democratic institutions as provided in the Constitution.

An even greater obstacle was the lack of social consciousness

[1] By the Prime Minister, Nūrī Pasha, in a speech to the Chamber, May 31st, 1931.

[2] Cf. publication by the Department of Public Works, 'Iraq: *Budget Estimates for the Years* 1930 *and* 1931 *and Capital Development Works Budget for* 5 *Years* 1931-35.

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embracing the State. Not yet had a sense of loyalty and duty to the nation arisen to surmount the differences between tribesmen and townsmen, between Sunnī and Shī'ī, and between Muslims and minority communities or to replace personal opportunism. Patriotism still denoted independence without obligations to the State.

In his impatience with these materials at hand for the creation of the new State, King Faisal may have gone farther than he was justified in attempting to mould the political institutions to his own will. On the other hand, it seems possible that had he not assumed the role of a benevolent despot, the political system of 'Iraq might have faltered and even collapsed entirely and the stable government insisted upon by the League of Nations as one of its criteria of 'Iraq's readiness for independence[1] would have been absent in 1932. It is equally probable that without King Faisal's guiding influence, supported by Great Britain, the 'Iraqī people in their impatience would have refused to agree to the obligations imposed by Great Britain as the price of her assistance. In the latter circumstance, Great Britain would have been forced to resume direct control or to withdraw from 'Iraq. Either course would undoubtedly have retarded for many years the entrance of 'Iraq into the League of Nations and her acceptance as a member of the international community.

Upon the accession of King Ghāzī I, September 9th, 1933, the young King, barely turned twenty-one and not less of a Nationalist nor less mindful of his position than his father, attempted to use the immense popularity he had acquired as the result of his openly displayed approval of the campaign against the Assyrians,[2] to exert the power of the crown and to take the reins of control into his own hands, after the example of his late father. The Prime Minister, Rashīd 'Alī al Gailānī, although

[1] *Official Journal*, November, 1931, pp. 2057 ff.

[2] *The Times*, September 1st, 11th, 1933. 'Iraqī-Assyrian relations are held to be outside the scope of this study. See *Survey of International Affairs*, 1934 (1935), pp. 135 ff.

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643 requested to remain in office at the death of King Faisal, was speedily convinced by conversations with King Ghāzī that he did not enjoy His Majesty's confidence.[1] His resignation, tendered October 28th, was immediately accepted to the great surprise of political circles. It was apparent that the young monarch desired not only a Cabinet amenable to his wishes but also a Parliament of his own creation. He was persuaded, however, by his British and 'Iraqī advisers against this course. Parliament was not dissolved and the new ministry, although headed by Jamīl Beg Midfai, was less Nationalist in tinge than he had desired.

On the whole, during the reign of King Ghāzī the personal power and influence of the Crown has tended to be less than under the former regime. His Majesty's youth, his inexperience and lack of training in statecraft have made it natural that he should be forced to give more scope than his father to the men about him, in his Palace and in the Cabinet, and to rely upon their advice and that of His Britannic Majesty's representatives
[645] at his Court. Thus few if any of the seven ministerial crises of the reign seem directly traceable to His Majesty's influence but have been due rather to discord within the Cabinets, as when Jamīl Beg Midfai resigned, February 13th, 1934, to lack of confidence to meet emergencies, as at the time of the tribal revolts in March, 1935,[2] or to military intervention as in the *coup d'état* of October 29th, 1936.

669 On this last occasion, General Baqir Sidqī,[3] in charge of army manœuvres to the north-east of Baghdad, suddenly moved the troops with the Air Force on the capital. In manifestoes dropped from the air, he demanded in the name of the army the dismissal of the Yāsīn Pasha ministry, with which 'the army had lost patience' and the appointment of one 'composed of

[1] See translation of Rashīd 'Alī's letter of resignation, *The Times*, October 30th, 1933.

[2] *The Times*, March 17th, 1935.

[3] Baqir Sidqi led the 'Iraqī forces against the Assyrians in 1933, when he won great popularity and promotion. His campaigns in 1935 against the tribes added to his reputation for military ability and ruthlessness.

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ous elements of the population for appointment by degrees to those posts where such appointment is expedient. Having done so, they should formulate their proposals with the names of candidates recommended in each case for my consideration and orders.

APPENDIX VII

643

SPEECHES MADE BY AMĪR FAISAL

(Excerpts from, after his arrival in Baghdad, 1921)[1]

(i) *Speech of Amir Faisal to the Mōsul Delegation*

'I say to you that the British Government is taking a wise line and fully intends to fulfil the promises made to my father in order to make the Arab Nation a true ally in the Middle East. The painful events which took place between me and the French have forced me to persevere in my efforts in the cause for which we arose in some other Arab country. Whereas 'Iraq is of importance to us as well as to the Arabs, my father delegated me in accordance with the wishes of 'Iraqis to perform this duty. I assure you that 'Iraq will remain independent with a constitutional government, free from all errors. Very shortly the national congress will be summoned and will introduce the constitutional law of this new Kingdom. I add, that in accordance with Mr. Churchill's declaration, 'Iraq will be an independent ally of Great Britain.'

(ii) *Speech at a Dinner given by Amir Faisal to the Ministers and Notables of Baghdad, 16 July*[2]

'I assure you that the British Government has determined to assist the inhabitants to establish an Independent Constitutional Government, thus fulfilling the promise made to my father.

'Moreover, the British Government has declared its readiness to help you as a friend to a friend in accordance with its historical tradition. . . . I am certain that when the permanent government is established and the Congress held, that it will look on this matter as I do and that we will be able to establish friendship between Great

[1] *Al-'Iraq*, July 7th, 1921. [2] *Lisān al-'Arab*, July 18th, 1921.

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643 Britain and the Arabs on such foundation as cannot be shaken and on promises which will preserve our honour and independence and safeguard our material interests.

'Our duty is to maintain our independence on a strong basis that we may keep it forever.'

(iii) *Speech to the Jewish Community of Baghdad, 18 July*[1]

'There is no meaning in the words Jews, Muslims and Christians in the terminology of patriotism, there is simply a country called 'Iraq, and all are 'Iraqis.

'I ask my countrymen the 'Iraqis to be only 'Iraqis because we all belong to one stock, the stock of our ancestor Shem; we all belong to that noble race, and there is no distinction between Muslim, Christian and Jew. To-day we have but one means to our end: the race.'

(iv) *Speech to the Shaikhs, Ramadi, 25 July, 1921*[2]

'Brothers! my word is yours and I deal with you as brother towards his brother, and as a friend towards his friend and not as a ruler towards his subjects. I am not a foreigner to you. You may accept my word in all confidence. I came to you knowing you to be Arabs and Beduin, and for the last four years I have not been in similar surroundings. All Muslims should be brothers. I have no doubt that you approach me with requests as subjects approach their ruler. I, in turn, ask you, tribesmen, to keep the peace. I must ask the tribesmen like Fahād Beg and 'Alī as-Sulaimān each of whom is equal to a thousand, and those who are present to act on behalf of those who are absent. The past has passed away. In the future you and I will demand certain things from each other just as I now ask the Arabs to guard themselves and to be done with past evils and troubles. We have had enough of pillage and robbery. Now that God has granted us our wish, we should give our thoughts rest and devote ourselves to the promotion of our best interests and the building up of our country, which things are in the interests of both the ruler and the ruled. Such things are attainable only by peace and loyalty.

'In the future, when the tribes gather together, we will look into any differences existing between them. I shall call the tribal chiefs

[1] *Al-'Iraq*, July 19th, 1921. [2] *Al-Dijla*, August 1st, 1921.

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and speak to them of the past. Muslims are brothers. They look up to no one but to me and the Government. Those present shall inform those who are absent. No one may raid another. This is what I want to tell you.'

At this point Fahād Beg rose and addressed the Shaikhs, saying: 'Do you want other than this?'

They all answered: 'No! No!'

Amīr Faisal then said: 'Will you be responsible to me for those who disobey?'

They replied: 'Your orders shall be obeyed and God shall bear witness to this.'

'What you order shall be done,' said 'Alī as-Sulaimān.

Fahād Beg added: 'We shall obey your orders because the British Government is your ally.'[1]

Amīr Faisal replied: 'We are in agreement with them [the British] and we must settle our affairs among ourselves.'

To this Fahād Beg replied: 'As to the Arabs, we will be responsible to you that 'Anaiza and Dulaim will be under your orders.'

'Alī as-Sulaimān then said: 'I undertake the same responsibility.'

Amīr Faisal said: 'There is another matter. Under a proper settlement, Arab traditions and the word of Arab rulers will be respected. I will be present among them, and will call together tribal chiefs and settle their disputes.'

(v) *Speech to the Catholic Christians of Baghdad, 30 July*[2]

'I thank this noble community which has given this reception. I make no difference between one community and another, because we are all noble 'Iraqis, and I, therefore, thank them for their confidence in my person, firstly, as an Arab and secondly, as an 'Iraqī. I desire to benefit from all the inhabitants of this country, whatever community or religion they belong to, and from every individual as well, so that we may regain our ancient glory. I also desire to make use of the qualifications and efficiency of each individual with-

[1] Amīr Faisal was clearly taken aback by this frank definition of the situation. See also Bell, op. cit., p. 615.

[2] *Al-Fallah*, July 31st, 1921.

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643 out consideration of personality or religion. All present or absent, must know that this is my belief. All must know that there is neither majority nor minority in this country. The minority are the majority and vice versa. We must make use of any person whomsoever he may be and choose him to carry on the work which he can do; and I therefore desire the nation to help me by maintaining tranquillity and peace. All 'Iraq looks to independence and civilization, the Beduin and the villager alike. For I see the Beduin who never came before to the cities are now asking for a piece of ground to cultivate and a canal to irrigate it. This also makes me hope for success.

'We need two things: firstly, the maintenance of peace in all parts of 'Iraq and secondly, patience. Let me say that 'Iraq for eight hundred years has been governed by foreigners, passing from one tyranny to another till it reached its present stage. Give me one year for every hundred, or one for every two hundred — in four years time come and ask me for an account of what I have done. But you must not be in too great a hurry, you must not be rash: do not let the sentiments of race and patriotism boil in your blood. The nation is busy with the swearing of allegiance. There may be some difference of formulas but all aim at one goal — independence. We must work with tranquillity and not hurry, lest we fall before reaching fundamental needs.

'I, Faisal, say to you, that my desire is Arab independence. Who does not wish for independence? The very beasts of the field desire it. If I did not hope to attain it I would not be here. I am determined to overcome obstacles and I am certain the nation will support me.

'Let me say a word of a more general kind about the interrelation of states. All are busy with their own affairs and every nation that desires to live must form a part of the community of people so that the interests of all may be realized. We are wanting in men of learning and experts, and money, materials and all that is necessary to civilization. These will not drop from heaven but we must ask for them from one of the nations of the world. The nearest nation to us, geographically and economically, is Great Britain, and our interests agree with theirs. So we stretch out our hand for mutual support as a free independent people and ask

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assistance as a younger brother demands from an elder, as a freeman from a freeman, not as a slave from a master, but as a friend from a friend. 643

'I am the friend of the British, and I ask the nation to hold towards them the friendship of the free to the free.'

APPENDIX VIII

H.M. KING FAISAL'S ACCESSION

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(Telegrams Exchanged on the Occasion of)

(i) *Telegram from H.M. King George V to H.M. King Faisal*[1]

'I offer Your Majesty my sincere congratulations on this historical and moving occasion when by the overwhelming vote of the people of 'Iraq the ancient city of Baghdad has once again become the seat of an Arab Kingdom. It is a source of deep gratification to myself and my people that combined military effort of British and Arab forces and those of their Allies has culminated in this memorable event. The treaty which will shortly be concluded between us to consecrate the alliance into which we entered during the dark days of the war, will, I am confident, enable me to fulfil my solemn obligations by inaugurating an era of peace and renewed prosperity for 'Iraq.'

(Signed) GEORGE, R.I.

(ii) *Telegram in reply from H.M. King Faisal*

'I am profoundly touched and greatly rejoice at the Royal and gracious favour which you have extended towards me and towards my people in Your Majesty's message.

'On this auspicious day when Baghdad the city of the Khalifs has become for the second time the capital of an Arab Kingdom, I recall with pride how white has been the hand of Your Majesty and Your noble people in the achievement of Arab aspirations. I am confident that the Arab Nation will justify Your Majesty's

[1] *Iraq Admin. Report, October, 1920, to March, 1922*, pp. 9-10.

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643 reliance on the success of their efforts to regain their pristine glory
648 provided that they continue to enjoy the support and friendship of Great Britain. I doubt not that the treaty which will be concluded between us, will strengthen the bonds of alliance already cemented with the mingled blood of Briton and Arab on the battle-fields of the Great War and that it will be established on unshakeable foundation.

'Finally, I wish Your Majesty and your honoured Nation continued prosperity and enduring glory.'

(Signed) FAISAL

APPENDIX IX

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PROTOCOL OF 30 APRIL, 1923

(To the Treaty with King Faisal, Signed 10 October, 1922)[1]

We, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries of HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY and of HIS MAJESTY the KING of 'IRAQ respectively, having been duly authorized, met together this 30th day of April, 1923, corresponding to the Ramazan, 1341, in order to sign the following Protocol to the Treaty of Alliance concluded between Their Majesties aforesaid on the 10th of October, 1922, corresponding to 19th Sa'far, 1341, Hijrah, subject to ratification.

PROTOCOL

It is understood between the High Contracting Parties that, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 18, the present Treaty shall terminate upon 'Iraq becoming a Member of the League of Nations and in any case not later than four years from the ratification of peace with Turkey. Nothing in this Protocol shall prevent a fresh agreement from being concluded with a view to regulating the subsequent relations between them before the expiration of the above period.

IN WITNESS OF WHICH the respective Plenipotentiaries have affixed their signatures thereto. Done at Baghdad in duplicate this

[1] Cmd. 2120.

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forces might be stationed with immunity from local jurisdiction and taxation. The Treaty was badly received by the nationalists, but was ratified by the Assembly in November 1931. On 3 October 1932, on the strong recommendation of the British Government, Iraq was admitted to the League of Nations as an independent state.

The nationalist leaders, who were soon afterwards called to govern, disappointed their followers' hopes of quick internal development and a revision of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, but retained some popularity by their ruthless treatment of the Assyrian question in the absence and against the wishes of the ailing King. His untimely death a few months later (in September 1933) was an irreparable loss. Even his outstanding talents had been tried in maintaining a balance on the one hand between nationalism and friendship with Great Britain and on the other between the antagonistic elements in the country itself, and his son Ghazi, who succeeded him at the age of twenty-one, though popular as a strong Arab nationalist, was inexperienced and inadequately advised. From the first, government was conducted haltingly by faction-ridden Cabinets which succeeded one another in rapid succession. By 1935 the factions were provoking tribal revolt, which yielded only to determined military intervention, in order to displace their rivals from power, and disappointed politicians were directing against the inefficient, reactionary, and increasingly authoritarian Government an alliance of reformist intellectuals who inclined to socialist or liberal democracy and of nationalist young army officers who favoured military dictatorship in imitation of Kemalist Turkey. This combination was brought to power in 1936 through a military coup d'état executed by General Bakr Sidqi in collusion with Hikmat Sulaiman, an admirer of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.

The movement ended within ten months as it had begun, in assassination and a military coup d'état. None of its pledges of reform had been fulfilled. Nationalists and reactionaries had neutralized and finally ousted the reformist elements, the army was divided, tribal chiefs alienated, popular liberties suppressed and a dangerous precedent set for military intervention in politics. In the following four years the army interfered time and again to secure the Government for rival politicians in the same factional politics of self-interest as had preceded the movement.

In foreign affairs the Government of this coup d'état had three treaties to its credit: a treaty of alliance with Saudi Arabia, a boundary treaty with Persia, and the Saadabad Pact between Turkey (the inspiring force), Persia, Iraq, and

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Afghanistan, which provided for consultation in all disputes that might affect the common interests of the four states.

Relations with Great Britain

During the period of independence the hostility of Iraqi nationalists towards Great Britain in no way diminished. The mandate had been replaced by a treaty that they had from the first opposed as denying full independence and their sentiments were strengthened by Syrian and Palestinian nationalists, deeply critical of British policy in Palestine, who took refuge in Iraq. A further stimulus was provided by Axis propaganda, which produced among nationalist groups not only hostility to Great Britain but a positive admiration for the totalitarian states. When King Ghazi killed himself in a motor accident in April 1939, to be succeeded by his infant son Faisal II, with the Amir Abdul-Ilah, Ghazi's cousin and brother-in-law, as Regent, there was a violent outburst of anti-British feeling in the belief that the accident was British-inspired.

Consequently, although the Iraqi Government severed diplomatic relations with Germany in September 1939, political opinion was divided on the measure of assistance to be granted to Great Britain under the Treaty; nationalists, especially in the all-important army, demanded non-belligerency and even the resumption of relations with Germany; and diplomatic relations with Italy were maintained. In 1941 the routine of political intrigue combined with nationalist and anti-British feeling and the effect of allied reverses, five years of Axis propaganda, and the presence of the Mufti of Jerusalem in Baghdad, to produce a chain of events which culminated in April 1941 in the last of the coups d'état. Rashid Ali al-Gailani seized power with the support of an army group more violently nationalist and anti-British than himself and formed a Government which was pledged to maintain Iraq's non-belligerency and displayed considerable sympathy towards the Axis. The Regent and several senior statesmen quitted the country. Relations were strained between the new Cabinet and the British Government, which was reluctant to recognize it, and on 2 May a disagreement over the passage of British troops through Iraq, on the basis of the Treaty, led to Anglo-Iraqi hostilities. These were terminated, after the introduction of further British forces and the Transjordan Arab Legion, on 29 May; by this time the Regent had returned to Iraq, the Rashid Ali Government had fled, and armistice negotiations were in progress. Shortly after the outbreak of Anglo-Iraqi hostilities the Iraqi Government had been in touch with

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645 The General's Cabinet dissolved all the political parties in-
666 cluding the Constitutional Union, but conceded the opposition
665 demand for single-stage elections. Elections, carried out in January 1953, were boycotted by all but one of the former opposition parties, including that of Salih Jabr, on the charge of governmental control. The resulting chamber naturally showed an enormous majority for Nuri as-Said, though neither the boycott nor the existence of martial law can greatly have affected the issue: the extreme parties had anyway no prospect of success and it would appear that the party of Salih Jabr, in spite of its alleged expectations, was already outmanœuvred. The Cabinet which was subsequently formed under Jamil [185] Midfai remained in power till September; it apparently abandoned and indeed reversed its predecessor's cautious [722] attempt at economic reform. With martial law in force for little short of a year, political activity and polemic was for the time being stilled; but the suppression of a riot and the election of a conservative Parliament have not altered the fundamentals of the situation. A new Cabinet was formed on 16 September by Dr Mohammed Fadhil Jamali, former President of the Chamber of Deputies; martial law was ended by royal decree on 8 October and political parties were permitted to resume their activities.

668 But urban unrest, inflamed by the increasing participation of students in politics, can be expected to continue and spread, eventually to the rural population as well, so long as the public believes that the economics and administration of the country are subjected to the interest of a ruling class and its supposed allies among Western imperialist Powers who, in its opinion, maintain the State of Israel and are likely to involve Iraq on their own side in a third world war. Much of the bitterness with which this belief is held springs from privation or the fear of it. Once substantial results appear from the new programme of development, and the public is made aware of them, a foundation will have been laid for political stability.

Government and Constitution

• 643 The King of Iraq is King Faisal II, son of King Ghazi and
642 grandson of King Faisal ibn Hussain. The legislative power is
646 vested with the King in Parliament. Parliament consists of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. Senators are appointed by the King from among those who 'by their acts have gained the confidence and trust of the people, and those who have an honourable past in the service of the Government and the country'. In number they may not exceed one-fourth of the

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Chamber of Deputies. The deputies are elected on the basis of one to every 20,000 male Iraqi subjects. Every bill must be submitted to each Assembly in turn and then approved by the King.

The Cabinet consists of at least seven ministers, including the Prime Minister, under whose presidency it meets, and any ministers without portfolio. The Prime Minister is chosen by the King, who also appoints the other ministers on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. The ministers are responsible to the Chamber of Deputies, jointly in matters which concern the ministries and severally in what concerns their respective ministries and the departments under them.

The ministries are those of Foreign Affairs, Finance, Interior, Social Affairs, Defence, Justice, Education, Economics, Communications and Works, Health and Agriculture.

Administration

Iraq is divided into fourteen main administrative districts, or *liwas*. These are the *liwas* of Mosul, Arbil, Kirkuk, Sulaimania, Diala, Baghdad, Kut, Dulaim, Hilla, Kerbela, Diwaniya, Muntafiq, Amara, and Basra. Each *liwa* is administered by a *mutasarrif*, who is responsible to the Ministry of the Interior but is also the agent and representative of the other ministries.

Armed Forces and Police

The Iraqi army has an establishment of three divisions, comprising one mountain division, one plains division, and a cadre division which includes a mechanized force. There are a cadet and staff college and the usual service training schools. Military training is compulsory in Iraq for all men between 18 and 25, the period of actual service being 1½–2 years. Students of the secondary, technical, and religious schools are exempt, and exemption may in any case be bought after three months' training by a payment of ID50. Iraq has a small but efficient and expanding air force equipped with British operational aircraft. A flying training college has recently been established.

The police force, with a total strength of over 20,000, has a militarized force of 5,000 including a mechanized regiment, and a small camel corps which patrols the deserts in co-operation with armoured cars.

Public Health

Malaria, enteric fever, bilharzia, amoebic and bacillary dysentery, tuberculosis, ankylostomiasis, venereal diseases, and

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to practice the various forms of worship, in conformity with accepted customs, is guaranteed to all inhabitants of the country, provided that such forms of worship do not conflict with the maintenance of order and discipline or public morality.

Art. 14. *(as amended October 27, 1943).* Iraq nationals have the right to present petitions of complaint and memorials, in matters concerning themselves personally or in public matters, to the King and to Parliament and to the public authorities, in the manner and in the circumstances to be prescribed by law.

It is not permitted, except to official bodies and juristic persons, to address the authorities in the name of a number of persons.

Art. 15. All postal and telegraphic correspondence and all telephonic communications shall be secret and free from censorship or detention, except in such circumstances and in such manner as may be prescribed by law.

Art. 16. The various communities shall have the right of establishing and maintaining schools for the instruction of their members in their own tongues, provided that such instruction is carried out in conformity with such general programmes as may be prescribed by law.

Art. 17. Arabic shall be the official language, except as may be prescribed by a special law.

Art. 18 *(as amended October 27, 1943).* Iraq nationals are equal in the enjoyment of civil and political rights and the performance of public duties and obligations. No distinction shall be made between them on account of origin, language or religion. To them alone shall public appointments, civil or military, be entrusted, and foreigners may not hold such appointments except in the exceptional circumstances to be prescribed by law.

PART II

THE PREROGATIVES OF THE CROWN

Art. 19. The sovereignty of the constitutional Kingdom of Iraq resides in the people. It is a trust confided by them to King Faisal, son of Husain, and to his heirs after him.

Art. 20 *(as amended October 27, 1943).*

1) The Heir Apparent shall be the eldest son of the King, in the

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642 direct line, in accordance with the provisions of the Law of the
643 Succession.

2) If there be no Heir Apparent according to the Law of Succession, the ablest adult male Iraqi of the sons of the eldest of the sons of King Hussein ibn Ali shall be the heir until there is an Heir Apparent.

Art. 21 *(as amended October 27, 1943).* On accession to the throne the King shall swear an oath before the Senate and Chamber of Deputies, assembled in joint session under the presidency of the President of the Senate, that he will uphold the Constitution and the independence of the country, and will be loyal to the nation and fatherland.

Art. 22 *(as amended July 29, 1925).* The King shall attain his majority on completion of his eighteenth year. In the event of the throne passing to a person below that age, the King's prerogatives shall be exercised by a Regent chosen by the former King, until such time as the King attains his majority. The Regent, however, may not assume this dignity, nor carry out the functions thereof, unless Parliament approves of his appointment. Should Parliament not approve, or should the former King fail to appoint a Regent, the Regent shall be appointed by Parliament. The Regent shall swear an oath before Parliament, as prescribed in the preceding article. Until such time as the Regent has been appointed and has taken the oath, the constitutional prerogatives of the King shall be exercised by the Council of Ministers on behalf of the people of Iraq, the Council being responsible therefor. No modification may be introduced into the Constitution during the Regency concerning the King's prerogatives and succession to the throne.

Whenever the necessity for the appointment of a Regent arises, Parliament shall be convoked immediately. Should the Chamber of Deputies be dissolved, and the election of the new Chamber be not yet completed, the former Chamber shall be convoked for this purpose.

Art. 23 *(as amended October 27, 1943).*

1) The King may, in case of need, absent himself from Iraq, by decision of the Council of Ministers, which must be published. Before leaving, the King will, with the approval of the Council of

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Ministers, appoint a Regent or Council of Regency, and define the powers which he delegates to him or them. 642 643

2) Neither a Regent nor any member of a Council of Regency shall exercise any right of the King until after he has taken the oath prescribed by Article 21 of this law.

3) If Parliament is sitting, the oath shall be sworn before it, in the manner described in Article 21; otherwise it shall be sworn before the Council of Ministers in the presence of the Presidents of the Senate and of the Chamber of Deputies, or those acting for them.

4) A Minister cannot be Regent or a member of a Council of Regency. If a member of Parliament is Regent or a member of a Council of Regency he shall not, during the period of the Regency, participate in the business of the Assembly to which he belongs.

5) If the absence of the King extends to more than four months and Parliament is not sitting, it shall be summoned immediately to consider the matter.

6) The Regent and the members of a Council of Regency must be Iraq nationals and not less than thirty years of age. A male relative of the King, who has completed the eighteenth year of his age, may be appointed.

Art. 24. The King may not ascend a throne outside Iraq, except with the consent of Parliament.

Art. 25. The King is safeguarded and is not responsible.

Art. 26 *(as amended October 27, 1943)*.

1) The King is Head of the State. He confirms laws, orders the publication, and supervises the execution thereof. By his order Regulations are issued for purpose of carrying out laws, within the express provisions thereof.

2) The King issues orders for holding General Elections for the Chamber of Deputies and for the convocation of Parliament. He opens Parliament, adjourns and prorogues it, and dissolves the Chamber of Deputies, in conformity with the provisions of this law.

3) If necessity shall arise, when Parliament is not sitting, for taking urgent measures to maintain order and public security, to repel a public danger, to incur urgent expenditure not sanctioned by the budget or by a special law, or to carry out the obligations of treaties, the King may, with the approval of the Council of Ministers

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642 issue ordinances, having the force of law, prescribing the measures to
643 be taken, as may be necessary in the circumstances, provided that they shall not contravene the Constitution. All ordinances must be submitted to Parliament at its next session, except those which have been issued for the purpose of fulfilling the obligations of treaties which have been approved by Parliament or the Constituent Assembly. If Parliament does not confirm the ordinances, the Government shall notify the termination of the operation thereof, and they shall stand repealed from the date of such notification. All Ministers must sign the ordinances.

The expression "Law" includes ordinances issued under this Article unless there is anything to the contrary in the context.

4) The King concludes treaties, provided that he shall not ratify them without the approval of Parliament.

5) The King selects the Prime Minister and, on his recommendation, appoints the Ministers and accepts their resignation from office.

6) The King may dismiss the Prime Minister if the public interest renders it necessary so to do.

7) The King appoints the members of the Senate and accepts their resignation from their office.

8) The King, on the recommendation of the responsible Minister, appoints and dismisses all diplomatic representatives, civil officials, qadhis and judges, and grants military rank and appoints divisional commanders and those above them, unless he delegates these powers, by law, to some other authority. He bestows decorations and titles and other marks of honour.

9) The King is Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces. He declares war with the consent of the Council of Ministers. He concludes treaties of peace, on condition that he shall not ratify them without the approval of Parliament. He declares Martial Law and the State of Emergency in conformity with the provisions of this law.

10) The coinage shall be struck in the name of the King.

11) The death sentence shall not be executed unless it is confirmed by the King. The King may reduce sentences or remit them

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by special pardon and, with the consent of both Assemblies of Parliament, he may proclaim a general amnesty. 642 643

PART III

THE LEGISLATURE

Art. 27. The King shall exercise his powers by means of Royal Iradas. They shall issue upon the proposal of the responsible Minister or Ministers, with the concurrence of the Prime Minister, and shall be signed by them. 642 646

Art. 28. Legislative power is vested in Parliament and the King. Parliament is composed of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies.

The legislature has the right of making laws and of amending and repealing them in conformity with the provisions of this law.

Art. 29. The King shall open Parliament in person or depute the Prime Minister or one of the Ministers for that purpose to perform the opening ceremony and deliver the speech from the throne.

Art. 30 *(as amended October 27, 1943)*. No person shall be a member of either Assembly of Parliament:—

1) If he is not an Iraq national who has acquired Iraq nationality at birth or by virtue of the Treaty of Lausanne[1] or by naturalisation, provided that, if he is naturalised, he belongs to an Ottoman family ordinarily resident in Iraq before the year 1914, and has been an Iraq national for ten years.

2) If he is less than thirty years old in the case of a deputy, or less than forty in the case of a senator.

3) If he has been adjudged bankrupt and has not been reinstated.

4) If he has been interdicted by the Court and the interdiction has not been removed.

5) If he has been sentenced to imprisonment for a term of not less than one year for an offense which is not of a political nature, or if he has been sentenced to imprisonment for any period for theft, bribery, breach of trust, forgery, fraud or any other offence adversely affecting his honour.

6) If he holds an official appointment in the Government or the departments connected therewith, or any office, appointment or employment under a person or institution which has a contract with a

[1] See Turkey, Note on Treaties, p. 503 below.